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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Management Board of the UK Actuarial Profession has identified enterprise risk management (ERM) as an area of 
growth, particularly within the financial sector. It is an area which offers opportunities for actuaries, working with other 
disciplines, to move out of their traditional sectors of employment, with the skill set required fitting well with an actuary’s 
training and practical focus. 
Members of the Profession also highlighted ERM as one of the two main areas where they wanted the Profession to focus 
their research efforts in the membership survey in 2009. Consequentially the Management Board allocated funds to support 
research projects in ERM in 2010-2011 and has worked with the ERM Practice Area Committee to identify the topics that they 
feel most suited to external research where the outputs will have a broad strategic value to the financial services sector.  
Background 
ERM has many definitions. The generally agreed concept is that ERM is wider than traditional risk management and covers all 
the risks within an enterprise (or company). Traditional risk management focuses on identifying risks, measuring and 
monitoring risks and designing strategies to limit losses to agreed limits. ERM recognises that businesses take risks in order to 
make a profit for their owners and therefore considers the upside of taking risks, and attempts to strike a balance between too 
much risk and not enough risk compared to the enterprise’s strategic direction. Risk is managed holistically in a fully integrated 
framework, across all different risk types and the different functions/companies within the organisation. 
The Call For Research 
The Profession invited proposals on a number of topics, which included the following areas: 
1. How should firms define and use “risk appetite”, but with the emphasis on the need that outputs should be practically 
grounded and expressed. 
2. How should firms identify and assess the hard to define risks – what techniques are available and how do they work 
in practice? This topic could possibly be linked with practical techniques for reporting on emerging risk and strategic 
risks, to mirror text from the recent Walker Report. 
This research was awarded to Milliman and the Universities of Bristol and Bath Systems Centre. 
The Research 
Traditional approaches to risk studies and risk management are based upon the paradigm of risk as an event adequately 
characterised by a single feature. This simplistic conceptualisation of risk leads to the use of analysis tools and models which 
do not reliably integrate qualitative and quantitative information or model the interconnectivity of the dynamic behaviour of 
risks. For complex systems, like an economy or financial organisations, a new paradigm or philosophy is required to 
understand how the constituent parts interact to create behaviours not predictable from the ‘sum of the parts’. Systems theory 
provides a more robust conceptual framework which views risk as an emerging property arising from the complex and adaptive 
interactions which occur within companies, sectors and economies. 
Risk appetite is a concept that many practitioners find confusing and hard to implement. The fundamental problem is that there 
is no common measure for all risks, and it is not always clear how different risk factors should be limited in order to remain 
within an overall “appetite”. Attempts are generally made to force everything into an impact on profit or capital but this is 
problematic when businesses and risk decisions become more complex. There is a lack of real understanding about how they 
would propagate, or indeed how the appetite may shift or evolve to have a preference for specific risks. 
By thinking holistically, risk appetite can be viewed as “our comfort and preference for accepting a series of interconnected 
uncertainties related to achieving our strategic goals”. By making those uncertainties and the connectivity of the underlying 
drivers explicit, it is possible for decision makers to define their risk appetite and monitor performance against it more 
effectively. The ability to link multiple factors back to financial outcomes also makes the challenge of expressing risk appetite in 
those terms more tractable. 
Similarly, the identification and assessment of emerging risks can become more robust by using a systems approach that 
enables a clearer understanding of the underlying dynamics that exist between the key factors of the risks themselves. It is 
possible to identify interactions in a system that may propagate hitherto unseen risks. Emerging risks can be viewed as 
evolving risks from a complex system. It is also known that such systems exhibit signals in advance of an observable change 
in overall performance. Knowing how to spot and interpret those signs is the key to building a scientific and robust emerging 
risk process. Also it is becoming increasingly clear that risk appetite and emerging risks are interconnected in many ways as 
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this research shows. 
Risk Appetite 
Assuming that strategic goals are already identified, establishing a risk appetite framework comprises two distinct parts, one 
top down and the other bottom up. First, it is necessary to describe how much uncertainty about the achievement of specific 
business goals is acceptable, and what the key sources of that uncertainty are. Second, it is necessary to identify the key 
operational activities or actions which contribute to each source of uncertainty  and then apply the necessary limits to those 
activities to maintain performance within the desired risk appetite. 
Systems techniques used in the case study proved extremely effective at helping businesses to explain their understanding of 
how uncertainty arises around their business goals. Cognitive mapping was used to elicit a robust understanding of the 
business dynamics creating uncertainty in business goals. This process was useful for engaging the business and capturing 
their collective knowledge of the risk appetite problem.  
By carrying out a mathematically based analysis on the cognitive maps it is possible to quickly and objectively identify which 
parts of the description are most important in driving explaining the uncertainties we are attempting to constrain. It also 
highlights areas which have not been particularly well described or understood, prompting further discussion and analysis. This 
provides a hypothesis for our risk appetite, and associated limit, framework. 
Bayesian Networks are proposed to provide a dynamic model of how the various risk factors connect and interact. This links 
the behaviour of the operational activities to the levels of risk they produce and can be parameterised through a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative data.  
Bayesian Networks permit evidence to propagate up and down the model, providing the business with a robust method for 
determining risk limits by setting the level of risk to be at the risk appetite point and observing what level the limits should be to 
ensure compliance with this level of risk. Alternatively, the observed indicator values can be entered and the implied level of 
risk is computed. Making this linkage explicit provides a mechanism for companies to understand more immediately where 
their risk exposure is coming from and how to control it.  
Emerging Risk 
There are a number of techniques which can be used from a systems perspective to provide insight into the development of 
risks and to give earlier warnings of emerging risk. One such technique is described in this research report which uncovers the 
evolutionary development of risks in a manner which provides structured information about the patterns of that evolution and a 
way to make sense of apparently unconnected risk factors. 
Phylogenetic analysis (a technique developed in the biological sciences) removes subjectivity in risk classification, using 
evolution as a kind of external reference point. This can be used to provide a methodology that makes clear the data, 
assumptions and results with the intention of making risk classification decisions transparent. It cuts across organisation 
boundaries and disciplines and looks at risks for what they are, at an almost fundamental level, and then groups them 
accordingly. This can be particularly useful for losses, if good loss data about individual losses is available.  
Understanding Risk History 
Phylogenetics can trace how risks have changed over time. This allows a much deeper understanding of the risks. Risks need 
no longer be seen as an event occurring now but can instead be understood by the interacting circumstances that have 
brought the risk into its current form. This allows companies to improve their understanding of vulnerabilities and how to 
prioritise their risk management resources and to manage their risks better.  
Predicting Risk Futures 
Phylogenetics provides a way to use the history of risk evolution as an indication of its future evolutionary pathway. Although 
past corporate behaviour does not ensure the understanding of future outcomes, it provides a guide to major risk factors, and 
understanding the history of a risk will give glimpses as to its future. By no longer viewing risk as a fixed entity but one that 
varies over time, a risk’s variations can be traced and its future state predicted.  
Risk can change and evolve in many ways but this does appear to happen in some predictable ways. Predicting the most likely 
future of the evolution of a risk will not only allow better risk mitigation but can prevent new risks from forming. From this, risks 
can be mitigated before they have even been identified as risks. 
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following chapters.  
Boundaries to the study 
The focus of the study is on the strategic management level of an enterprise, not at any specific function or industry sector 
level. Hence risk appetite and emerging risks will be viewed from a strategic perspective within an enterprise, even though 
multilevel risk interactions across an enterprise are at the heart of these issues. Influences on the enterprise from the outside 
environment such as market and regulatory changes will be considered in relation to how they might impact on the problem or 
necessary for control and monitoring. The tools developed, however, can be applied in an analogous way at lower levels of the 
organisation to cascade the high level results through organisational layers to achieve a robust and consistent framework.  
Structure of the report 
Chapter 2 –  A brief review of the relevant literature relating to risk appetite from a practitioner’s perspective. This forms the 
basis for matching the systems concepts to the domain specific problem of risk appetite.  
Chapter 3 –  A brief review of the relevant literature relating to emerging risks from a practitioner’s perspective is then 
presented, including a discussion about systemic risks.  
Chapter 4 –  In this chapter we give an overview of the key concepts of systems thinking, complex adaptive systems and 
complexity and how these may specifically relate to the issue of risk appetite and emerging risks.  
Chapter 5 –  Then a set of tools and techniques from the complexity sciences and systems science are discussed in relation to 
how useful they might be to the stated problem of risk appetite and emerging risk.  
Chapter 6 –  Based on a series of research workshops this chapter illustrates how the selected tools have been used when 
applied to a case study based on data from a life insurer,  to trial against a number of real case studies. The 
methodology, application, analysis, results and conclusions are presented.  
Chapter 7 –  This chapter is very similar in approach but applies a specific technique to emerging risk to data from a multi-line 
international insurer. Again the emphasis is on the methodology, analysis, results, interpretation and conclusions. 
There are also details of appropriate software and different approaches.  
Chapter 8 –  This is the final chapter before references and the appendices and consolidates the key messages from this 
research and gives guidance practitioners on how to begin to tackle the very contemporary questions of risk 
appetite measurement and how to identify emerging risk.  
A full set of references, bibliography, glossary, useful contacts and appendices are included at the end of the report. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE RISK APPETITE CONCEPT IN ERM 
The latest financial turmoil has caused unprecedented harm to the economy locally and globally. Consequently governments, 
regulatory bodies, professional associations, as well as financial institutions are working closely to create robust and stable 
conditions for financial markets. In order to achieve this, a series of reports has been published; one of the most significant is 
the Turner Review (March, 2009). The report explains the fundamental differences between risks involved in performing bank 
or bank-like functions and those involved in non-bank financial and non-financial activities, such as life insurance, with a view 
to stressing the systemic (interconnected) nature of the financial industry as a whole. Lord Turner advocates the underpinning 
philosophy of intensified supervision, which: 
 ‘...focuses on macro-analysis, systemic risks and judgements about business model sustainability, and away from the 
assumption that all risks can be identified and managed at a firm specific level.’ (Page 92, Turner Review, March, 2009)  
Hence, risk management in financial institutions is expected to meet new standards highlighted in the Walker Review (July, 
2009), which aims to review and enlighten corporate governance in the UK financial sector. Walker stresses the importance of 
board-level involvement in risk management at banks and other financial institutions by stating that: 
 ‘...given that the core objective of a bank or other financial institution is the successful arbitrage of risk, board-level 
engagement in the high-level risk process should be materially increased with particular attention to the monitoring of risk and 
discussion leading to decisions on the entity’s risk appetite and tolerance.’ (Page 9, Walker Review, July, 2009) 
Sir Walker goes further in identifying the role of the Board and risk appetite suggesting that firms:  
‘Heightened and intensified board focus above all in monitoring risk and setting the risk appetite and relevance parameters 
which are at the heart of the strategy of the entity.’  
The viewpoints expressed in the Walker Report also echo the current international trend. For example, an OECD report on ‘the 
corporate governance lessons from financial crisis’, (Kirkpatrick, 2009) makes it clear that:  
‘... a company’s risk management and remuneration systems shall be compatible with its objectives and risk appetite, which 
are largely the board’s responsibility to oversee.’ 
Also, the ‘Pension funds risk-management framework’ oversight OECD paper (Stewart, 2010), suggests:  
‘...risk appetite shall be clearly stated in the risk policy and be determined by senior management. Moreover, risk appetite, 
which reflects the level of risk which any specific institution wants or is allowed to engage, should be part of the corporate risk 
culture...’  
In December 2010, the Financial Reporting Council announced an initiative to explore how companies are responding to the 
new UK Corporate Governance Code provision on Board’s responsibilities for risk. One of the areas that are being considered 
as part of this review is how Boards are determining their appetite for risk. 
Although the prominence of risk appetite is clear, the applicability of risk appetite as a concept remains a challenge. A brief 
overview of current concepts from different perspectives is discussed in the next section to appreciate common issues around 
application. 
Different perspectives and practices  
The literature on risk appetite can be roughly categorised into four groups: finance; insurance; regulatory; and, 
psychology/behavioural research. Key concepts from each perspective are presented and discussed in relation to their 
practical application.  
Risk appetite in a financial context 
Kanh (2008) describes risk appetite as ‘the willingness of the investors to bear risk’. Accordingly, risk appetite is expected to 
affect their holdings of risky assets, i.e. investment instruments, and hence the concept of risk appetite is closely coupled with 
‘risk premium’, which is essentially defined as the extra yield gained for holding a risky asset. Calvo (2003) goes further and 
argues that, risk appetite is a driving force for the capital flows which significantly affect the risk premium for the economy.  
Measuring risk appetite 
Generally, there are two approaches towards measuring risk appetite in the finance industry, that is, index-based approaches 
and model-based approaches.  
Index based approaches include: the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, (CBOE VIX), which is recognised as a 
well-established indicator of market risk aversion tendency, or risk appetite. The value on the VIX is essentially the square-root 
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of the risk neutral expectation of S&P variance over the next 30 calendar days. That is, when the VIX appears to have a higher 
value, investors in the market may ‘fear’ that a higher degree of volatility would likely be observed in the future, leading to an 
increased premiums for options, so investors perceive the market as more risky, resulting in a decrease in their appetite for 
risk and vice versa.  
The other school of thought for measuring risk appetite attempts to arrive at a parameter via the route of financial modelling. 
Kumar and Persaud (2002) used asset pricing models to argue that changes in risk aversion modify the rank of expected asset 
returns, while changes in asset riskiness do not affect the relative ranks. By following this logic, the authors derived an 
indicator for changes in investors’ risk aversion, called the Risk Appetite Index (RAI), which is given by Spearman’s rank 
correlation between expected excess returns and asset riskiness in a cross-section of assets. The RAI has obtained 
considerable acceptance as a measure of risk aversion (appetite). However, the RAI is based on two assumptions:  
1. Equally weighted assets with a zero cross-correlation of returns, and 
2. The absence of common shocks to the portfolio.  
Both these assumptions seem to be unrealistic in the modern business environment.  
Application in the financial market  
Studies (Herrara and Perry (2002), Herrero and Ortiz (2004), Kanh (2008)) have shown that risk appetite, especially on a 
macro level, has asymmetric impacts on market performance. When the risk appetite of investors decreases, risk premium 
increases, which reflects increased market volatility. When investors’ risk appetite comes back, or they become less risk 
averse, such a change does not affect risk premium volatility. This would indicate that in a financial market balanced by ‘greed’ 
and ‘fear’, ‘fear’ (risk aversion) might be the dominant influence in the disequilibrium of the system.  
According to Misina (2008), risk appetite changes over time, but much less frequently than a simple inspection of the index 
would suggest. There are two types of changes: infrequent and isolated changes; and, more persistent changes. The former is 
always related to something unusual to the market, such as introducing a new regulation to all investors, whereas the latter 
often indicates a general shift in market, for instance the wave of pursuing high-tech stocks in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Furthermore, changes in risk appetite are much less frequent than investors’ newsletters, reports, and a variety of risk appetite 
indices in current use would suggest.  
Wang (2003) argues that risk appetite measurement in the financial context should not only focus on quantitative methods but 
also take a broader perspective on the fundamentals. For instance, investors’ psychological status, behavioural conventions, 
and collective decision-making can have significant influences on risk appetite. Moreover, investors’ perception of risk also 
plays a crucial role in determining risk taking behaviours.  
Risk appetite in insurance context 
A recent paper (Besar et al, 2010) presented to the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries highlighted the differences between 
insurance companies and other financial institutions, making the particular choice of ‘risk appetite’ statements quite unique in 
insurance companies. They suggest that although insurance companies or pension plans may have many fixed contractual 
liabilities, they are not directly linked to financial infrastructures (for this they rely on banks), and they also do not rely on short 
term withdrawable funding and are not involved in the provision of unsustainable credit expansions. Therefore, banks and 
other institutions, have relatively different risk exposures so that the choices of ‘risk appetite’ could have evolved differently.  
Kamiya et al (2007) suggests that practitioners in accounting, risk management and actuarial areas hold diverse views towards 
the definition of risk appetite. Some of the diverse views they found include:  
? The level of aggregate risk that a company can undertake and successfully manage over an extended period of time; 
? A company’s ability and/or willingness to absorb declines in the value of an asset, liability, trade, transaction, or 
portfolio; 
? The broad-based amount of risk a company or other entity is willing to accept in pursuit of its mission or vision.  
Chapman (2006) points out that risk appetite is a relatively new term that has arisen as the fields of financial and enterprise 
risk management have developed. Although sometimes equated with risk tolerance or risk threshold, risk appetite is much 
more complex than these alternatives. Risk tolerance and threshold imply that risk has only a negative or painful aspect and 
that there is a certain amount of risk that can be borne, implying that risk has a positive element so that decision about 
assuming risks involves much more than simply measuring potential negative results.  
D’Arcy (2009) argues that risk appetite ‘reflects the multiple dimensions of risk in a very similar way’. Companies have a taste 
for certain types of risk that others may avoid. This can be due to favourable past experience, specialised expertise or how a 
risk fits with other aspects of their operations. An ERM Guide from the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) and the Faculty and 
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Figure 2.2 – Applying risk appetite, adapted from Batty et al (2010) 
The model breaks down risk appetite exercises into four phases, namely: risk appetite planning; defining appetite, tolerance, 
and limits; reconciling risk profile and appetite; and documenting the outputs. All of these are composited by specific activities. 
As can be seen, this process can perform better if it is implemented in synergy with an organisation’s ERM framework.  
On the other hand, Korthals et al (2010) provide an alternative perspective as illustrated in figure 2.3.  
Key risk measures
Risk management processes, policies and procedures
GAAP earnings 
volatility
Shareholder focus
Risk of stat 
insolvency
Policyholder and 
shareholder focus
Required economic 
capital
Policyholder and 
shareholder focus
Other risk 
constraints
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Figure 2.3 – Applying risk appetite, adapted from Korthals et al (2010) 
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In Korthals’ model risk appetite is more than an internal issue and it should meet investors’ and policyholders’ expectations as 
well as solvency and regulators requirements. Guidance of best practice in determining a risk appetite statement is provided 
by Korthals as follows: 
? There is an implied contract between the Board and management as to how much they are willing to put at risk and 
for what level of return. 
? The risk appetite is articulated explicitly — transparency and communication to stakeholders are critical. 
? A common metric is in place to understand key individual risks and how much in total is at risk across the organisation 
and is used to optimize risk/return within the risk tolerance and risk limits. 
? The risk profiles of the business units and the enterprise consider stress events to ensure the company can withstand 
unexpected events. 
? Risk limits for individual business activities are established through a quantitative, bottom-up aggregation process. 
? The top down risk tolerances are modelled and reconciled for consistency with the bottom up risk limits. 
? Adherence to the risk appetite, risk tolerances and risk limits is monitored and reported. 
Risk appetite in a regulatory context 
In recent years, regulators across the world have begun to regard risk appetite as a pivotal aspect of risk management in 
financial institutions. The Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS, replaced by 
EIOPA from 1 January 2011), repetitively mentioned risk appetite as the core in risk management and a clear statement of risk 
appetite is expected in the risk management framework.  
An EU (2010) report highlighted that in the financial services sector: 
‘It is important to avoid any moral hazard by not diminishing the responsibility of private stakeholders. It is therefore the 
responsibility of the board of directors, under the supervision of the shareholders, to set the tone and in particular to define the 
strategy, risk profile and appetite for risk of the institution it is governing’.  
The “shareholders” referred to above can be more generally thought of as the providers of capital, e.g. members in the mutual 
sector. The Commission also concludes that their failure to identify, understand and ultimately control the risks to which their 
financial institutions were exposed is at the heart of the origins of the crisis. Several reasons or factors contributed to this 
failure: boards of directors were unable or unwilling to ensure that the risk management framework and risk appetite of their 
financial institutions were appropriate. 
A common theme from regulatory bodies is that ‘few firms can properly articulate their overall risk appetite’ and ‘board-level 
directors should be involved in determining risk appetite’. In particular, it has been found that appetite for operational risk is 
even harder to realise as quantitative methods are inapplicable in this area. Furthermore, reports (GAO 2009, FSA 2006) 
produced by the US and UK regulators’ implied that high-level management does not fully understand the importance of risk 
appetite and not actively involved in its determination.  
From a regulator’s viewpoint, the significant issues in risk appetite application are: 
? Producing meaningful statements of risk appetite has posed significant challenges for many firms.  
? Although most firms have defined their risk appetites, there has been slow progress by boards and management to 
go beyond definition and apply them as a point of reference for material decision making.  
? Many firms have not cascaded their appetite statement to operational and technical staff. 
? Applying a risk appetite to operational issues has proved challenging for most firms. 
? Only a few firms to date, as part of their embedding of the ICAS2 process, have considered establishing a link 
between their risk appetites and their management of solvency. 
? Some firms have not consistently monitored adherence to their risk appetites or reviewed them for some time. 
There appears to be a big step between defining and applying risk appetite.  
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2 Individual Capital Adequacy Standards are a Solvency I calculation specified by FSA for UK regulated firms. 
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Risk appetite and management behaviour 
Much of the behavioural theory applied to the understanding of managerial risk taking has been based on the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) on the risk propensity of individuals. Kahneman and Tversky identify that individuals evaluating 
options tended to try to simplify decision making by the use of heuristics3 and that they were also prone to personal biases. 
They concluded that even experienced researchers can show bias when they think intuitively in connection with complex 
problems, often forgetting fundamental statistical rules. In decision theory the subjective probability of a given event occurring 
is essentially the quantified opinion of an idealised person. The derived probability is subjective in the sense that different 
individuals will have different probabilities for the same event. While the subjective probability approach should allow a 
rigorous subjective interpretation of probability, this is not enough in practice as the judgements will be compatible with the 
beliefs held by the individual decision maker. The rational individual will attempt to make probability judgements compatible 
with their knowledge of the subject matter, the laws of probability and their own judgemental biases. These factors influence 
the decision maker’s perception of the risk. 
Bromiley (1991) and Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) describe an extension of prospect theory to the firm. They argued that a 
firm’s aspirations serve as target or reference levels. Firms anticipating returns below the relevant reference level will be risk 
seeking while those above will be risk averse. Palmer and Wiseman (1999) also point out that when decision makers are faced 
with the prospect of failing to meet their objectives, they accept higher risk options that offer an opportunity to attain the 
objective and avoid the loss.  In contrast, when decision makers think they will achieve their goals they will take the safer 
options that avoid jeopardising the attainment of the goals.  
Adams’ (2001) model of risk compensation is shown in figure 2.4 below.  The model shows that an individual’s risk propensity 
and perceptions are interdependent and adapt as a result of past outcomes (rewards or accidents). 
Risk compensation theory postulates that when individuals make decisions involving risk they balance the expected rewards of 
their actions against the perceived costs of failure. In other words they carry out a balancing act in which their perception of the 
risk is weighed against their propensity to take the risk. This propensity to take risk depends in part on the potential rewards 
and partly on the decision makers’ risk preferences and prior general appetite for risk. 
 
Figure 2.4 – Risk Compensation Mode (Adapted from Adams (2001)) 
Adams (2001) describes the ‘balancing behaviour’ within his risk compensation model as being governed by the individual’s 
risk preference, or his ‘risk thermostat setting’, or ‘comfort level’, or ‘risk appetite’ in this study. As described, Adams postulates 
that all individuals have a ‘risk thermostat’ that defines a level of risk with which they are content.  
Adams goes on to claim that it also varies ‘from one group to another’ and ‘from one culture to another’ but states later that the 
risk compensation hypothesis is ‘an explanation of individual, not collective, behaviour’.  For this reason he claims that risk is 
not reduced by the efforts of risk managers but, rather, it is redistributed. This is also referred to as behavioural adaptation 
(OECD, 1990).  
  
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
3 A method of solving a problem for which no formula exists, based on informal methods or experience, and employing a form of trial and error iteration. 
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Summary  
As can be seen from the literature, there is no agreed definition of risk appetite as groups hold different viewpoints based on 
their experience and knowledge. Integrating all the relevant perspectives the authors proposed a working definition of risk 
appetite as: 
“the degree of comfort and preference for accepting a series of interconnected uncertainties about  achieving corporate goals.” 
In the same spirit of integration, eight key guidance points for applying the risk appetite concept in an organisation, with 
particular focus on the insurance sector, are given below: 
1. Be systematic and holistic in nature.  
2. Be integrated into the organisation’s ERM framework. 
3. Have high level involvement in an organisation, often board level. 
4. Have alignment with an organisation’s strategy, policy and culture. 
5. Should be consistent over time but can be reviewed, audited and modified regularly. 
6. Utilise both quantitative and qualitative measures and methods. 
7. Be capable of dealing with new and emerging risks. 
8. Should incorporate, stakeholder, regulator and or policy holder’s expectations. 
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3. OVERVIEW OF EMERGING RISKS 
According to a report presented by the International Actuarial Association (2008), emerging risks are ‘developing or already 
known risks which are subject to uncertainty and ambiguity and are therefore difficult to quantify using traditional risk 
assessment techniques’ (Page 37, August, 2008).  For the purposes of this paper we use the term emerging risk to include the 
categories of risks, ‘hard to define risks’ and ‘systemic risks’, although a brief description of each is given  in the following 
sections for completeness.   
The reason why emerging risks are problematic is because, by their very nature, they are not well addressed and tend to come 
as a surprise. In practice, a wide range of risk classification methods are used in an attempt to cover the existence of most 
risks, hereby reducing the surprise. Unfortunately, any classification cannot be complete as new risks emerge making the 
functionality of the classification system subject to the time point of observation. Moreover, most risk classification methods 
adopt a reductionist approach to break risks down into components, which then use those elements to categorise risks.  
Kelliher et al (2010) have conducted research on risk classification frameworks and present a very useful classification set, 
presented in summary form here in table 3.1. The full list is extensive at over 250 categories, which, if combined with the 
concept of risks having multiple characteristics, could be extremely useful in identifying emerging risks. These sorts of 
classification and risk characteristic systems are becoming increasingly powerful when linked with enterprise wide software 
database systems.   
FSA’s Systems 
and Controls 
handbook (SYSC) 
German regulator Lloyd’s Banking 
Group 
Prudential’s 
Enterprise Risk 
Management 
framework 
Risk Classification 
Working Group 
(the Actuarial 
Profession) 
Market 
Credit 
Insurance 
Liquidity 
Operational 
 
Market 
Credit 
Underwriting  
Liquidity 
Operational 
Concentration  
 Strategy 
Reputation 
 
Market 
Credit 
Insurance 
Operational 
Financial  
Business  
Market 
Credit 
Insurance 
Liquidity Risk 
Operational 
Business 
Environment Risk 
Strategy  
Market 
Credit 
Insurance & 
Demographic 
Operational 
Liquidity  
Strategy  
Frictional Risks 
Aggregation & 
Diversification 
Table 3.1 – Risk classification review (Adapted from (Kelliher, 2010)) 
Features of emerging risks 
Although the concept of emerging risk is still developing it is possible to summarise the research on the key features of 
emerging risks shown in table 3.2 below.  
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Common features of emerging risk 
? Uncertainty: there is little information available and the frequency and severity is difficult to assess; 
? Difficulty in quantification: risk is uncertain and the risk transfer may be questionable; 
? No industry position: no single insurer wants to make the first move for fear of losing market share: cater 
for increased genetic testing by stipulating full disclosure clause; 
? Difficulties for risk communication: there is the danger of investors or management  reacting to phantom 
risks; 
? Regulatory requirement: supervisory involvement is often necessary; 
? Identification: while their existence is undisputed, they cannot necessarily be proven in a clear and 
comprehensive manner; 
? Describability: it is possible to describe them, albeit not necessarily in a conclusive manner; 
? Causality between risk source and resultant losses: in many cases, their technical/scientific causal 
relationship with respect to specific losses cannot be conclusively and verifiably proven and sound 
arguments supporting such a relationship can be established only conditionally; 
? Assessability in monetary terms: the scope of their consequences can be assessed in monetary terms 
only inadequately and imprecisely. 
Table 3.2 – Key features of emerging risks 
Emerging Black Swans 
Nassim Taleb (2007), in his book ‘The Black Swan’, articulates the theory of the black swan. In general, the theory is 
composed of three pillars:  
1. Rare events, especially those never seen before, have disproportionate levels of impact and are beyond people’s 
conventional comprehension;  
2. Identifying those rare events are beyond the capability of conventional methods, especially numerical methods; 
3. Those rare events are a challenge to people’s worldview. It is also pointed out that psychological biases, either 
individually or collectively, prohibit understanding uncertainty, as people always use historical data to judge the future 
and neglect the roles of rare events in the course of history.  
In order to define a black swan event, Taleb describes three attributes. First, a black swan event has extraordinary impacts. 
Second, it is an outlier and is outside of the realm of regular expectation. Historical probability cannot convincingly predict the 
event. Third, people can only explain the event after its occurrence, making interpretation a posterior activity. Collectively this 
means that limited prior knowledge is available in relation to a black swan event. Examples of black swan events in recent 
decades could be: the development of personal computers and the internet; terrorist attacks; the collapse of a country; and, a 
global financial market turmoil caused by subprime crisis. Following such logic, Bayesian statistics can be applied to test 
people’s knowledge regarding a real world scenario and then Bayesian inference can be used to update information as 
evidence emerges.  
It should be noted that, the term ‘black swan’ used by Taleb originates from the work of the German philosopher Popper who 
questioned the value of traditional scientific positivism methodologies and instead proposed an approach of falsification and 
exception as the way to push discovery and theory forward.  
Emerging risks and black swans 
Fundamentally, the existence of a black swan is due to our blindness when dealing with uncertainty. Current approaches look 
back into historical data to draw patterns and use such patterns to predict the future. This mechanism is like driving a car on a 
bumpy country road with nothing but a rear-vision mirror: one only knows what has passed and what the surface of the road 
was like. This sort of information is useful for providing a general impression of the road and to make predictions on how the 
road might look ahead, however it cannot predict the next turn or an obstacle ten meters away.    
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Looking beyond black swans 
Although the black swan theory articulates that the utility of prior information is significantly constrained when predicting black 
swan events, near future events can be decoded. The time difference between a future event and the observation time point 
determines whether the event is a black swan event or not. For instance, the emergence of internet technology is a black swan 
phenomenon for people living in the 1960s. However, it was not a total surprise in the mid-1990s as computer technology, 
especially personal computers, was advanced enough to provide the infrastructure and people never stopped their pursuit for 
better communication. Or in other words, the mid to long term future are full of black swan events, but there may  be some 
clues for the near future, implying that the observation point is in fact another determinant for black swan events.  
Using biology to look at the black swan problem makes emerging risks appear somewhat more predictable. We have seen 
white swans all the time and black birds are common everywhere. So, at least in evolutionary terms, a black swan is a strong 
possibility. It is certainly more likely than a 3-winged, green and purple striped swan. In these regards, we believe that, given 
an appropriate time point, the prior signal of an event can be observed using biological evolutionary system methods. If the 
newly emerged DNA can help the offspring survive the environment better, it is likely to be passed to its descendants. 
Otherwise the emergence will stop at the offspring level. Over a period of time, the accumulations of newly developed features 
make the offspring a standalone species and such a process produces ‘black swans’ in the biological world. Evolutionary 
approaches are perhaps a more natural and intuitive direction to look for emerging risk understanding, as postulated by Allan 
et al 2010. Such an approach is currently applied, in the pharmaceutical industry to predict the evolution of viruses and then 
develop antibiotics in advance.  
Linking systemic risks and emerging risks 
This study primarily focuses on emerging risks but there are a number of similarities with systemic risks, both in their 
description and behaviour, which warrant a short discussion. Some common features and attributes shared between systemic 
and emerging risks are: 
? They are both highly linked to interactions. 
? They can use the same management process, as stated by Ingram (2010). 
? They can expose the organisation to a similar degree of impacts. 
? They can lead to huge losses among interconnected institutions. 
? They can be triggered by similar events. 
? They are interchangeable in many circumstances. 
? They can affect the organisation’s strategic objectives. 
Some useful definitions of systemic risk are provided below.  
Systemic risks as emerging risks  
In relation to the recent financial crisis, Besar et al (2009), reviewed a number of definitions of systemic risk, and proposed a 
new definition: 
‘A systemic risk materialises when an initial disturbance is transmitted through the networks of interconnections that link firms, 
households and financial institutions with each other; leading, as a result, to either the breakdown or degradation of these 
networks.’  
Such a definition highlights the interconnected nature of participants in the financial market and it is the network of participants 
that realise the possibility of a systemic risk.  
Helbing (2010) defines systemic risks as ‘the risks that can trigger unexpected large-scale changes of a system or imply 
uncontrollable large-scale threats to it,’ emphasising the fact that effects of systemic risks are disproportional to the size of the 
initial risks or shock.  
COSO (2004) explains why systemic risk is harder to manage than conventional risks. 
‘Systemic risk, unlike conventional risks whose negative impacts can be assessed and managed, emanates from either 
internal or external sources and occurs so promptly that it leaves little time for management to respond. Such a risk not only 
affects an institution’s ability to achieve objectives, but also influences other institutions via connections.’ 
The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (2008), a collection of senior decision makers in leading financial 
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institutions, made five recommendations for controlling systemic risks, regardless of the degree of the understanding in 
systemic and emerging risks. Table 3.3 provides a brief summary of their recommendations.  
Five recommendations 
Precept I: The Basics of Corporate Governance: from time to time, all large integrated financial 
intermediaries must examine their framework of corporate governance in order to ensure that it is 
fostering the incentives that will properly balance commercial success and disciplined behaviour over 
the cycle while ensuring the true decision-making independence of key control personnel from 
business unit personnel. 
Precept II: The Basics of Risk Monitoring: all large integrated financial intermediaries must have, 
or be developing, the capacity (1) to monitor risk concentrations to asset classes as well as estimated 
exposures, both gross and net, to all institutional counterparties in a matter of hours and (2) to 
provide effective and coherent reports to senior management regarding such exposures to high-risk 
counterparties. 
Precept III: The Basics of Estimating Risk Appetite: all large integrated financial intermediaries 
must periodically conduct comprehensive exercises aimed at estimating risk appetite. The results of 
such exercises should be shared with the highest level of management, the board of directors and 
the institution’s primary supervisor. 
Precept IV: Focusing on Contagion: all large integrated financial intermediaries must engage in a 
periodic process of systemic “brainstorming” aimed at identifying potential contagion “hot spots” and 
analyzing how such “hot spots” might play out in the future. 
Precept V: Enhanced Oversight: specifically, it is recommended arrangements whereby the 
highest-level officials from primary supervisory bodies should meet at least annually with the boards 
of directors of large integrated financial intermediaries. The purpose of the meeting would be for the 
supervisory authorities to share with the board of directors and the highest levels of management 
their views of the condition of the institution with emphasis on high level commentary bearing on the 
underlying stability of the institution and its capacity to absorb periods of adversity. 
Table 3.3 – Five recommendations (CRMPG III, 2008) 
A recommendation of particular interest is that the systemic risk exposure of an institution is related to its risk appetite. 
Moreover, appropriately estimating risk appetite can reduce the possibility of being affected by a systemic risk. 
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Conclusion  
In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the emerging risks concept, it has been rationalised that ‘hard to define 
risks’ are equivalent to emerging risks which in turn have considerable similarities with systemic risks. The key features of 
emerging risks are summarised in table 3.4 from different sources of literature.  
Characteristics 
? Scale of impact 
? Degree of impact 
? Possibility of occurrence 
? Dynamism 
? Connectedness 
? Speed of spreading 
? Evolution 
Table 3.4 – Characteristics of key features of emerging risks 
The black swan theory is reviewed in the context of emerging risk. It is argued that, in the near future, black swan risks may 
give out some clues that can be identified and modelled. The practical application of this thinking will be explained in Chapter 
5.  
Emerging risks are difficult to identify because of the combination of their dynamic, highly interconnected and evolutionary 
nature.  In other words they behave like the outputs from a complex adaptive system. 
Using Complexity Science in ERM 22 
Practical tools for Risk Appetite 
And Emerging Risk 
10 November, 2011 
4. AN OVERVIEW OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE 
“The more we study the major problems of our time, the more we come to realize that they cannot be understood in isolation. 
They are systemic problems, which mean that they are interconnected and interdependent.” (Capra, 1996) 
Introduction to systems thinking, complexity and complex systems 
Systems thinking is both a worldview that:  
? Problems cannot be addressed by reduction of the system; 
? System behaviour is about interactions and relationships; and, 
? Emergent behaviour is a result of those interactions. 
And a process or methodology: 
? To understand complex system behaviour; 
? To see both the “forest and the trees”; 
? That can identify possible solutions and system learning; and, 
? That utilises complexity science and other disciplines.  
The development of complexity science is a shift in scientific approach towards an interdisciplinary paradigm with the potential 
to profoundly affect business, organisations and government. The goal of complexity science is to understand complex 
systems: what rules govern their behaviour, how they manage change, learn efficiently and optimise their own behaviour. 
Systems thinking 
The origins of systems thinking can be traced back at least 2,500 years to the ancient Greek philosophers. It is different from, 
but complementary to, other ways of thinking, such as scientific reductionism, for example. This postmodern thinking led to 
difficulties managing the fit between engineering and physical science’s quest for determinism through a reductionist paradigm 
and ideas of emergence, paradox, disorder and self organisation (Jackson, 2004).  Checkland (1993), a computer scientist by 
training, introduced a distinction between hard systems and soft systems as a bridge: 
? Hard systems of the world are characterised by the ability to define purpose, goals, and missions that can be 
addressed via engineering methodologies in attempting to, in some sense, ‘optimise’ a solution. 
? Soft systems of the world are characterised by extremely complex, problematical, and often mysterious phenomena 
for which concrete goals cannot be established and which require learning in order to make improvement. Such 
systems are not limited to the social and political areas and also exist within and amongst enterprises where complex, 
often ill-defined patterns of behaviour are observed that are limiting the enterprise’s ability to improve. 
Systems thinking is essentially the process of discovery and inquiry that uses techniques to understand the interrelationships 
and underlying patterns of problems and opportunities. Systems thinking is used to address complex problems and can be 
applied in any discipline or practice.  
“Systems thinking enables you to grasp and manage situations of complexity and uncertainty in which there are no simple 
answers. It's a way of 'learning your way towards effective action' by looking at connected wholes rather than separate parts. 
It's sometimes called practical holism.” (Open University) 
Peter Senge (1990) in his seminal work on learning organisations describes systems thinking as: 
? A discipline for seeing wholes 
? A framework for seeing interrelationships, for seeing patterns of change rather than static snapshots 
? A set of general principles distilled over the course of the twentieth century, spanning fields as diverse as physical 
and social sciences, engineering and management 
? A specific set of tools and techniques 
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however can also exhibit ‘self-organising’ behaviour: starting in a random state, they usually evolve toward order instead of 
disorder (Kauffman, 1993). The behaviour of a CAS is nonlinear and can be sensitive to small differences in initial conditions, 
so that two systems with very similar initial states can follow radically divergent paths over time. Consequently, historical 
accidents may "tip" outcomes strongly in a particular direction (Arthur, 1989).  Furthermore this occurs in a similar fashion to 
the evolution process described by Charles Darwin in his Theory of Evolution (Nelson and Robinson, 1982), granting path-
dependency and evolutionary properties to the CAS. 
CAS resist simple reductionist analyses, because interconnections and feedback loops preclude holding some subsystems 
constant in order to study others in isolation. Because descriptions at multiple scales are necessary to identify how emergent 
properties are produced (Bar-Yam, 1997), reductionism and holism are complementary strategies in analysing such systems 
(Fontana and Ballati, 1999). It is an inclusive approach that does not attempt to dismiss, but indeed complements, scientific 
approaches.  
Not surprisingly, a key property of CAS is complexity itself. Complexity science developed later than systems science yet their 
mutual development is itself complex, interwoven, adaptive and important as demonstrated by figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2 – Roadmap of the development of complexity science (Wikipedia 2010) 
Complex Adaptive System Lifecycles  
Hitchins (2007) describes how interconnected systems driven by an external source will tend to a cycle of progression in which 
system variety is generated; dominance emerges and suppresses the variety; the dominant mode decays or collapses; and 
survivors emerge to regenerate variety. Romme and Despain (1989) demonstrate this in natural systems with a classic 
example of why major forest fires are relatively rare (1:40 years) in Yellowstone National Park, despite the fact that lightening 
fires occur almost every year.  
The process and the concept is expanded and described in detail in Appendix A and Hitchins (2007) argues that the same 
process occurs in financial markets, organisations, societies or, indeed, any open complex system with an energy or 
information source. The significance of this lifecycle model is that it provides an insight into how systems evolve and change 
over time and, most interestingly, what the likely causes of the downfall are and what might be done to prevent it.  
Complex Adaptive Systems and Insurance Companies 
An important aspect of social and economic systems is that they are complex systems and (re)insurance companies make no 
exception. The Geneva Association (2010), a leading think tank in the industry sector, perceives insurance companies as 
complex because an insurance company:  
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? Operates diverse types of activities through numerous legal entities (e.g., simultaneously operating banking, 
insurance and fund management subsidiaries); 
? Operates across borders with centrally managed capital and liquidity (as opposed to simpler networks of national 
subsidiaries); and, 
? Has exposures to new and complex products and markets that have not been sufficiently tested. 
The commonality of complex systems can be traced in insurance companies, i.e. a large number of interacting (mutually 
coupled) system elements (such as individuals, companies, countries, cars, etc.). These interactions are usually dynamic and 
nonlinear. Typically, such systems tend to be dynamic rather than static, and probabilistic rather than deterministic, exactly the 
same as an insurance company. The lack of predictability and controllability can be partly attributed to externality, i.e. 
exogenous events, and partly to the internal mechanism of the system.  
A report by the American Society of Actuaries, (Mills, 2010), entitled, Complexity Science: An introduction (and invitation) for 
actuaries, emphasises the need for a new breed of actuaries who understand the complex nature of social systems. We highly 
commend this report to readers. A brief set of conclusions can be found at the end of Appendix A. 
Complexity science 
A significant amount of work has been done under the umbrella of complexity without a universal agreement upon its precise 
definition. As traced by Gell-Mann (1995), the English word ‘complex’ is derived from the Latin word ‘complexus’, which means 
braided or entwined together. Mitleton-Kelly (2003) termed complexity as the inter-relationship, inter-action and inter-
connectivity of elements within a system and between the system and its environment. A good example of a complex system is 
the financial market, in which a large number of investors, brokers, agencies, regulators, and other participants are 
interconnected and interact with each other.  
Paradoxically, some complex interactions among highly differentiated parts can produce surprisingly simple, predictable 
behaviour, featuring simple laws and rules, (Anderson, 1999). Cohen and Stewart (1994) summarised this nicely by pointing 
out that normal science shows how complex effects can be understood from simple laws; chaos theory demonstrates that 
simple laws can have complicated, unpredictable consequences; and complexity theory describes how complex causes can 
produce simple effects.  
Kauffman (1993), on the other hand, takes a slightly different perspective, seeing complexity as the principal related to non-
linear properties of a system. This non-linearity is often associated with the uncertainty of complex situations.  Uncertainty, so 
central to modern risk management, has a special relationship with complexity as more complexity increases uncertainty and 
increasing uncertainty can be a key influence in increasing complexity.  
With respect to social systems, Daft (1992) equates the level of complexity with the number of activities or subsystems within 
the overall system, noting that it can be measured along three dimensions. Vertical complexity is the number of hierarchical 
levels, horizontal complexity is the number of elements across the whole system, and spatial complexity is the number of 
geographical locations. Time is often considered a fourth dimension of complexity, in that a system can interact with its 
environment and thus evolve over time.  
Summary and relevance to Risk Appetite and Emerging Risk 
This section details why and how complex system approaches and techniques are particular useful in the context of this 
research. 
Risk Appetite 
Risk appetite is not a single stand-alone concept; many interdependent and connected components form a risk appetite, e.g. 
we are unlikely to have an aggressive appetite for longevity risk if we have limited capital and extensive legacy risk. The real 
world relationships between different components give rise to feedback mechanisms, presenting potentially nonlinear 
behaviour of the system. For instance, an equity shock which weakens a firm and leads to regulatory intervention, in turn 
leading to a loss of confidence with downgrades, persistency problems and a collapse in new business.  
Further, the effects brought by those interacting relationships become less predictable over time and this is referred to as 
emergence.  
Further, risk appetite, in practice, is often expressed as a statement that includes multiple inputs, not all of which can be 
explicitly presented by a single value. In that, probability states or fuzzy sets are more appropriate for describing the nature of 
risk appetite. Over time, a company can change its risk appetite because the business and regulatory environment are 
dynamic resulting in changes to risk capacity (how much risk a company can take as constrained by its available resources). 
This property is characterised as evolution or co-evolution. During the course of evolution, a company may encounter different 
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scenarios and these events can gradually re-shape the risk appetite and risk capacity. Over time, risk appetite is dependent 
upon the path of the decision-making exercises and external environment of the company.  
Emerging Risk 
Emerging risks are the emergence of unintended consequences as a result of complex interactions between strategic 
objectives, existing risks, risk management interventions, business and regulatory environment, markets and people’s 
behaviour. Historically, emerging risks dependent upon these interactions and this is referred to as path-dependence.  
An important source of emerging risk is the combination and integration of existing risks, or subsets of their characteristics. For 
instance, when people input incorrect data into a newly established IT system, this operational risk may cause serious 
problems in other fields, such as financial reporting or reputational risks through poor servicing. The combined symptom can 
be understood as an emerging risk but in fact it is deeply rooted in existing risks – it is the combination and integration of 
existing risks that often give rise to new risks.  
As noted, risks within a company or an organisation are highly interdependent and connected both to each other and to the 
environment they exist and evolve in. When they are away from an equilibrium state, mitigation actions do not function 
properly, and may cause additional effects that propagate through a network of risks. For example, market volatility brings 
down equity prices and reduces the underlying value of a company’s assets. If the reduction is significant, rating agencies may 
decide to downgrade the company’s rating, making it more difficult or expensive to raise funds. The deterioration in their 
financial situation forces the company into a spiralling loop that feeds information back into the system.  
Emerging risks do not suddenly appear from nowhere and there are always possible leading indicators, even though they may 
be hard to recognise. Emerging risks are the product of an evolutionary process and it takes time for them to be realised.  
Complex systems concepts appear to closely relate to the problems of defining risk appetite and identifying emerging risks. 
This allows us to bring a wide range of tools and techniques from systems and complexity science to bear on our problem. The 
next section discusses some possible prominent methodologies and their application. 
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5. COMPLEXITY SCIENCE AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS TOOLS & TECHNIQUES 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a systems thinking paradigm helps solve the challenges of describing risk appetite and enables 
appropriate risk limits to be attached to key business drivers; and makes identifying emerging risks from their underlying 
drivers philosophically viable. Furthermore, systems and complexity science provide a rich pool of possible tools and 
techniques that may be useful for this specific study. The next task is to select the most appropriate technique(s), from the 
broad spectrum available, to address these two problems, individually or collectively.  
Requirement Specifications for the Tools & Techniques 
By summarising the specific nature and characteristics of the ‘risk appetite’ and ‘emerging risk’ problem, it was determined that 
a candidate solution or methodology must satisfy the following eight criteria to some extent: 
Soft systems criteria 
1. Rigour: the solution shall be based on rigorous quantitative methods; 
2. Expert interaction: expert knowledge shall be integrated into the solution; 
3. Adaptation: the ever changing nature of the problem shall be properly reflected; 
4. Computability: it takes a reasonable time to arrive at results.  
Hard systems criteria 
1. Data requirement: the solution shall be viable regardless of the availability of hard data; 
2. Accuracy of results: precision is preferable; 
3. Operability: non-academic business users can repeat the method for their own purposes; 
4. Application availability: the methodology shall be based on software packages that are affordable by a wide range of 
organisations but scalable to multi-national group solutions. 
The eight criteria do not exist in isolation and they are in fact intertwined. Nonetheless, they have been used as individual 
measures in order to select the most appropriate tools using a Likert Scale type measurement to quantify each as shown in 
table 5.1 below. 
Criterion  Very Low Low Medium High  Very High 
1. Rigour Heuristics  Reasoning and 
extrapolation 
Newly developed 
methodologies 
Combination of 
existing 
methodologies  
Well established 
methodologies  
2. Expert 
Interaction 
No expert knowledge 
is embedded 
Limited expert 
knowledge is 
embedded 
Considerable expert 
knowledge is 
embedded 
Extensive expert 
knowledge is 
embedded 
Purely based on 
expert knowledge 
3. Adaptation No adaptive 
behaviour can be 
reflected 
Limited adaptive 
behaviours are 
embedded 
Adaptive behaviours 
are partially 
embedded 
Lots of adaptive 
behaviours are 
embedded 
Allow for full range 
of adaptive 
behaviours 
4. Data 
Availability  
Large quantity of 
time series data  
Time series data Quantitative data Written documents Narrative 
descriptions 
5. Accuracy Description Descriptive 
estimation 
Quantitative 
estimation 
Precise estimation 
with certain 
confidence 
Precise estimation 
with high confidence 
6. Operability Consultants are 
needed 
Training course is 
needed 
A few hours training is 
needed 
A few hours reading 
is needed 
Little knowledge is 
needed 
7. Application 
Availability 
Cost>£1000 or few 
available 
£500<Cost<£1000 
or a few available 
£300<Cost<£500 or 
quite a few available 
Cost < £300 or 
many available 
Freeware or many 
available 
8. Computability Mainframe 
computer/grid are 
needed 
A few hours on PC A few minutes on 
normal PC 
A few seconds on 
normal PC 
No computer is 
needed 
Table 5.1 – Measurement of Criteria 
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Visualising the options 
With the above measurement regime, the two problems can be specified against the criteria to portray the ideal tool, displayed 
as radar diagrams below in figures 5.1 & 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.1 – Radar map showing benchmark for evaluating tools for the Risk Appetite problem 
 
Figure 5.2 – Radar map showing benchmark for evaluating tools for the Emerging Risk problem 
The radar maps illustrate the requirements for the proposed methodologies visually. Theoretically, the radar map of a perfect 
methodology to tackle a problem should exactly fit the corresponding radar map of the problem. However, due to the usual 
practical constraints, no perfect match is expected and therefore the task for selecting a methodology in the systems and 
complexity science domains is to find the ‘best match’.  
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A rationale of the Systems and Complexity Science Tools Reviewed 
This research has reviewed eleven of the most prominent systems and complexity science approaches: Concept Mapping, 
Systems Dynamics Modelling, Chaos Theory, Fuzzy Logic Theory, Neural Networks, Genetic Algorithms, Phylogenetic 
Analysis, Bayesian Belief Networks, Cellular Automata, Agent Based Modelling, and Network Theory. Each is briefly described 
in the following sections and assessed against the measurement regime in table 5.1. 
Concept Mapping 
Concept mapping is a technique to visualise the complex and nonlinear relationships between different concepts. According to 
studies conducted by Novak (1998), existing knowledge facilitates one’s assimilation of new knowledge and so the ability to 
utilise, and hence exploit, existing understanding becomes pivotal. Abstract or concrete concepts can be denoted as nodes 
and their interrelationships can be visualised as links so that they formulate a system in the appearance of a map. This allows 
the use of analytical techniques to identify potent concepts or patterns. In doing concept mapping exercises, one can capture 
an explicit view of existing knowledge and learn from it. However, concept mapping is often perceived as a qualitative 
technique because of its inability to produce hard numerical results.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 – Radar map for concept mapping 
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Systems Dynamics Modelling 
Systems dynamic (SD) modelling can help users understand the nonlinear relationships of different elements and allows users 
to include their subjective judgements in models. Once a model is established, the system can simulate future scenarios using 
deterministic rules as well as random values. A significant advantage of this method is to understand the internal structure of a 
system, such as feedback or feed-forward loops, and how properties emerge from the interacting elements. A noticeable 
drawback of such a technique lies in its validation and verification. It is not usually the case that all assumptions can be 
rigorously tested. In practice, the explanatory functionality of SD modelling is more valuable than its capability in making 
accurate numerical predictions. The radar map for SD is illustrated below in figure 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – Radar map for SD modelling 
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Chaos Theory 
Chaos theory is extensively employed to explain complexity, dynamics, and the nonlinearity of a system. A small change to the 
input or the initial state of a system, which is usually expressed in mathematical equations, can lead to disproportionate 
consequences. This phenomenon is often referred to colloquially as ‘the butterfly effect’. In fact, chaos theory effectively 
elucidates how a system adapts to both internal changes and external shocks. The application of chaos theory is largely 
subject to the generalisation of mathematical equations of a system, and this can present significant practical challenges in 
real life situations. However, attempting to apply chaos theory is an effective organisational learning process to understand the 
system better. Not many software vendors compete in this market area so, even if a solution was produced as part of this 
research, users will probably need significant programming knowledge before tailoring any tool for their own analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 – Radar map for chaos theory 
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Fuzzy Theory 
Uncertainty and vagueness in information limit the functionality of traditional methods that are based on crisp logic. Fuzzy 
theory is developed to overcome this insufficiency by taking account of ambiguity in information. A number can be crisp as well 
as fuzzy, which recognises the ‘degree of truth’. In doing so, set theory, which is the foundation of probability theories, is 
converted into fuzzy set theory and all subsequent applications are updated to be able to incorporate fuzziness. When using 
fuzzy logic, people’s qualitative description as well as quantitative estimation can be elaborated to maximise its utility. 
Regarding the applicability aspect of fuzzy theory, the major concern is the efficiency of converting uncertainty and vagueness 
into fuzzy values. The concepts of fuzzy logic have been widely applied in engineering and artificial intelligence but general 
practitioners still find the concepts a little difficult to engage with.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 – Radar map for fuzzy theory 
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Neural Networks 
A Neural Network, or an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) in particular, is an automated multi nonlinear regression process. The 
structure and mechanism of ANN is inspired by human neurons and ANN can equip certain learning capability. With such a 
capability, ANN can be applied to make predictions and recognise patterns as well as other purposes. Although there are a 
number of ANN software packages available on the market, most of them appear to be like a “black box” to users and require 
a degree of skill in parameterisation. If one wants to operate a fully customised ANN, i.e. specially designed artificial neurons 
or neuron hierarchies, it would be necessary to have extensive programming as well as mathematical knowledge. Some 
financial institutions already use such models to predict or model risks, but this is a specialist area. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 – Radar map for neural networks 
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Genetic Algorithms 
The concept of evolution has profound implications in various areas and genetic algorithms (GA) are influenced by this. In 
most cases, a GA is applied for optimisation purposes. Once the parameters of a problem are decided and a GA model is 
populated with them, the GA modelling will simulate natural selection processes, i.e. reproduction, mutation, fitness tests and 
etc. Offspring that carry superior features can survive and their ‘genes’ are passed into the future generation. After multiple 
iterations, the criteria of a GA might be met or the cost of such a process might be too high to tolerate. The final outputs could 
be the optimised results. Genetic programming (GP), on the other hand, adopts a similar approach but optimises functions 
instead of optimising parameters of functions. Up to now, the application of GA is largely constrained by its high requirement 
on programming knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 – Radar map for genetic algorithms 
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Phylogenetic Analysis 
Phylogenetic analysis looks into the evolutionary relationships using rigorous mathematical methods. It should be noted that 
such an evolutionary relationship is not limited to biological creatures but is applicable to any entity that has complex adaptive 
behaviours. By applying phylogenetic analysis evolutionary relationships of entities can be inferred from which people can 
obtain classifications of entities, predict emerging entities and hypothesise the properties of those emerging entities. Whilst 
relatively easy to understand in concept, the algorithmic computational process of phylogeny is relatively complicated but a 
collection of software is available for this purpose. Perhaps the difficulty in applying phylogenetic analysis lies in its 
philosophical aspects. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9 – Radar map for phylogenetic analysis 
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Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian networks (BN), also known as belief networks, are one of the blooming scientific frontiers. Algorithms in BN enable a 
system to perform inference and learning. Visually, a BN is in a hierarchy structure with nodes cascading in layers, allowing 
users to visually understand the logic relationships among variables. Software packages are widely available and can deal with 
the complicated computation processes. They usually provide a range of analytical tools to help carry out a variety of related 
tasks, such as sensitivity and scenario testing.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 – Radar map for Bayesian networks 
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Cellular Automata 
As a particular kind of simulation technique, cellular automata (CA) are very effective in exploring the discrete behaviour of 
interacting elements in a complex system. The microscopic behaviours of an element, or a cell, can be modelled using simple 
rules. By interacting with other elements, emergent patterns can be observed. Or in other words, CA enables the aggregated 
patterns to be understood with a bottom-up approach, which is different from the conventional reductionist paradigm. Thus, CA 
is a means of facilitating the motif ‘the whole is greater than the sum of parts’. On the other hand, modelling CA requires 
considerable programming knowledge and behaviour rules must be modified repetitively if accurate results are expected. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 – Radar map for cellular automata 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
Rigour
Expert 
Interaction
Adaptation
Data 
Availability  
Accuracy
Operability
App 
Availability
Computability
Cellular Automata
Using Complexity Science in ERM 38 
Practical tools for Risk Appetite 
And Emerging Risk 
10 November, 2011 
Agent Based Modelling 
Agent based modelling (ABM) is well known for its ability in simulating the behaviours of agents. Each agent is controlled by a 
set of behaviour rules or decision rules and it can make autonomous decisions or reactions. That is, when the environment 
changes, an agent makes its own decision to either adapt itself accordingly or do nothing. Such a mechanism allows for the 
observation of emerging patterns of a system in a prompt manner. Further, ABM provides a direct way to view the nonlinear 
relationships between agents in a system. Theoretically, most objective-oriented programming environments can facilitate 
ABM, and there are specific software environments available for ABM from a variety of sources. Whilst ABM is a very powerful 
modelling technique it has to be used with care if precise values are required and is often best used to explore system 
behaviours rather than specific values. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12 – Radar map for ABM 
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Network Theory 
To some extent, everything is somehow connected and network theory holds this proposition to study relationships. In order to 
apply network theory, an object is conceptualised as a node (or vertex) and its relationships with others are denoted as edges. 
Different mathematical theorems, algorithms, and measures can be applied to arrive at useful information such as: clustering 
and grouping; the identification of cycles; and, the importance of individual nodes to flows around the network. There are many 
software packages available which can assist with the analysis of networks, but the challenge for most users will be the 
efficient creation of the network in the first place.  
 
 
Figure 5.13 – Radar map for network theory 
Summary and Final Selection of the Tools  
Their radar maps are shown so that both positive and negative aspects of a tool can be compared to the problem 
specifications. The data availability issue is a key concern for the Neural Network and Genetic Algorithm tools as these two 
depend heavily on large quantity of time series data, which are not very likely in this research. Furthermore, the operability 
issue limits the viability of Systems Dynamics modelling, Chaos Theory, Genetic Algorithm, Cellular Automata, and Agent 
Based Modelling. In fact, these five tools require considerable programming and mathematical knowledge from users. 
Considering the time and resource limits of most actuaries, these five tools are not likely to be applied on a large scale unless 
some specifically designed modules are available. Similarly, application availability issues make Chaos Theory and Genetic 
Algorithms impractical for this study as few ready-to-use software packages are available on market at a reasonable cost.  
Network theory, on the other hand, survives the hard criteria selection but can show little adaptive behaviour of a system. The 
discrepancy between its existing capability and the requirements of the two problems is so big that it has to be left out. 
Therefore, Bayesian Networks, Fuzzy Theory, Concept Mapping and Phylogenetic Analysis are the remaining candidates for 
both problems. The former two seem to be able to meet most criteria set by both problems and they are most suitable for the 
Risk Appetite problem, whilst the Phylogenetic Analysis cannot meet the accuracy requirement of Risk Appetite problem, yet 
could be applied to the Emerging Risk problem. It should be noted that concept mapping as a stand-alone technique does not 
really met the accuracy test but its capability for robustly eliciting and analysing scenarios, it could be utilised as an auxiliary 
tool for both the research challenges. Therefore, the proposed methodology for addressing the two problems will be 
constructed using Bayesian Networks, Fuzzy Theory, Concept Mapping, and Phylogenetic Analysis whilst keeping other 
techniques and tools in the background for use if necessary.  
The following chapters will demonstrate how we address real world risk appetite and emerging risk problems using our 
proposed methodologies. 
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6. RISK APPETITE CASE STUDY - CONCEPT MAPPING AND BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
A well known insurance company was used as a basis for trialling the integrated use of concept mapping and Bayesian 
networks (BN) approach. The theory behind concept maps and Bayesian belief networks is briefly explained here and we will 
take the reader through the various stages of the application to give sufficient detail to allow an experienced practitioner to 
apply these techniques in their organisations.  
Concept Mapping 
A concept map is a model which allows complex interconnected factors to be shown in a simplified diagrammatic form, so that 
the overall picture can be understood and communicated to a wide audience. Such maps are particularly useful for identifying 
and analysing strategic issues, as these are often complex in nature and contain a wide range of factors interacting in a 
nonlinear manner. Also they can help visualise the complex and nonlinear relationships between different concepts.  
The approach is built upon Personal Construct Theory, Kelly (1955) and Concept Mapping, Eden (1999), which is a soft 
systems analysis technique. Personal construct theory suggests that we make sense of the world in order to predict how, all 
things being equal, the world will be in the future, and to decide how we might act or intervene in order to achieve what we 
prefer within that world (Eden and Ackerman, 2004). Cognitive mapping allows an account of a problem to be broken into its 
constituent elements. These are treated as distinct concepts which are then reconnected to represent the account in a 
graphical format.  
 
Figure 6.1 – Typical concept map hierarchy (after Eden & Ackerman, 1998) 
In the context of risk appetite people have a mental map of the risk exposure they are interested in but their individual view will 
likely be incomplete, or maybe just hard to make sense of or articulate. Concept maps draw everyone’s contribution to the “risk 
story” which can be used to make a “theory” about the risk appetite and exposure. Abstract or concrete concepts can be 
denoted as nodes and their interrelationships can be visualised as links so that they formulate a system in the appearance of a 
map, allowing for analytical techniques to identify potent concepts, structure and key connections. In doing concept mapping 
exercises, one can capture an explicit view of existing knowledge and learn from it. The technique is particularly helpful for 
identifying areas where the descriptions from different participants conflict or where parts of the description are too brief and 
underdeveloped or indeed where they simply don’t seem to make sense. 
A simplified concept map that has been reduced in complexity to expose key levers is shown in figure 6.2. The nodes with lots 
of interconnections are likely to be worth looking at first. The red nodes in figure 6.2 represent key nodes which are most 
central in the system and are key levers for action or mitigation; the yellow nodes are stated goals or aims; and the orange 
Typical Concept Map Hierarchy
Goals/Strategy
Key drivers or 
scenarios
Options, 
assertions, 
facts, data
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nodes are beliefs about the strategic risk and risk appetite. Typically an hour long interview would generate over 100 nodes 
and need to be analysed by computer programs to identify the key nodes, clusters, loops and hierarchies. In this paper we use 
a program called, ‘Decision Explorer ’4, but other software is available.  
 
Figure 6.2 – An example of a simplified concept map  
Bayesian Belief Networks 
Bayesian Networks (BNs), also known as belief networks or Bayesian Nets for short, are a directed acyclic graph (DAG) model 
to represent knowledge about uncertain domains. A DAG model is composed of a set of nodes (vertices) and directed edges. 
In that, the nodes are the variables that symbolise the events or beliefs under investigation whereas the edges connect nodes, 
without any closed loop, to represent the direct dependent relationships between two nodes. A directed edge from variable Xi 
to variable Xj denotes that the value of Xj is conditional to some extent upon Xi. Or in other words, an edge visualises the 
relationship between Xi and Xj by indicating how Xi influences Xj using conditional probability where variable Xj is the child of 
the parent variable Xi. 
  
Therefore, according to Friedman et al (1997), a Bayesian network B is an annotated acyclic graph that represents a joint 
probability distribution (“JPD”) over a set of random variables V. The network is defined by a pair, ܤ ൌ ሺܩ, Θሻ, where G is the 
DAG whose nodes Xi, Xj … and Xn represent random variables, and their edges represent the direct dependencies between 
these variables. The graph G encodes independence assumptions, by which each variable Xi is independent of any variables 
other than its parents in G. The second component denotes the set of parameters of the network. This set contains the 
parameter Θ௫೔|గ೔ ൌ ஻ܲሺݔ௜|ߨ௜ሻ for each realisation xi of Xi conditioned on πi, the set of parents of Xi in G. Thus, B defines a 
Bayesian JPD over V as: 
஻ܲሺ ଵܺ, ܺଶ … ܺ௡ሻ ൌ ෑ ஻ܲሺ ௜ܺ|ߨ௜ሻ ൌ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ෑ ߠ௑೔|గ೔
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
The structure of a Bayesian Network is mathematically rigorous and intuitively explicable. Normally, a Bayesian Network has a 
clear directed hierarchical structure where the nodes on a higher level are the parents of those next to them. The relationship 
between parent(s) and a child is represented as a joint conditional probability and thus enables information to be propagated in 
both directions. Furthermore, the construction of BN follows one’s instinct and common sense as descriptive information and 
qualitative knowledge would be sufficient. Yet, domain expert knowledge can improve the quality of a BN.  
The analytical power of Bayesian Networks lies in their ability to enable inference and learning. With regards to inference, BN 
techniques allow one to make predictions as well as diagnose. That is, if the parents’ information is available, the states of a 
child can be obtained using Bayes’ theorem, whilst if the evidence of child’s state is observed or observable, the states of 
parent nodes can be reasoned in a posterior manner. A simple example is shown below in figure 6.3. Suppose we have a prior 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
4 Decision Explorer is available from www.banxia.com 
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Figure 6.4 – A set of high level business objectives and interconnected risk sources. Light blue being risk sources directly related to 
the Board level objectives. 
Step 2 – Build the net 
We now need to identify the sources of uncertainty in these business objectives. This is done by starting at a high level and 
adding further granularity in subsequent layers. There is a balance between obtaining “pure” sources of risk and being able to 
operate the framework practically. It is therefore advised to have no more than three levels of sources. 
In this example, the light blue nodes in figure 6.4 are (from left to right): Credit Counterparty Default Risk; Market Risk; Liquidity 
Risk; Life Underwriting Risk; Operational Risk (Balance Sheet); Operational Risk (P&L) and Operational Risk (Reputation). 
We then add an additional layer of granularity which is shown in two steps in figures 6.5 and 6.6 below, where the green nodes 
represent the next layer of risk sources.  Typically the amount of detail chosen will reflect the modelling capabilities of the 
business and therefore the nature, scale and complexity of the business itself.  
 
Figure 6.5 – Populating the network for Credit Counterparty Default Risk and Market Risk 
 
Figure 6.6 – Populating the network for Life Underwriting Risk; Operational Risk (Balance Sheet); Operational Risk (P&L) and 
Operational Risk (Reputation) 
Note that for operational risk there are interconnections across the risks, as one might expect. Also, Liquidity risk has not been 
expanded, because there are some direct indicators for this risk source.  
The dynamic relationship between these source nodes and the business objectives can be calibrated through any combination 
of capital/profit modelling results and expert judgement. If sufficient data is available it is possible to derive these top level 
structures through a Bayesian learning process. 
Step 3 – Joining Top to Bottom 
In this phase of the net building process we are trying to determine measurable indicators for each risk type source and for 
different levels of risk. For example: 
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? If credit risk was high what level of BBB investments might we be holding? 
? If process risk was high how many open audit issues would there be? 
? If people risk was low how many people’s roles are properly aligned to their expertise? 
In practice to identify these indicators, a combination of cognitive and data-driven methods is required.  
To illicit the expert knowledge required, to help identify the indicators, cognitive mapping (as described at the beginning of this 
chapter) is used, which typically follows the approach below: 
? Workshop with experts to describe risk dynamics 
? Note management actions/controls 
? Describe observable outcomes of drivers 
? Convert workshop discussion into cognitive map 
? Analyse map to elicit key features 
? Propose candidate indicators 
? Seek confirmation from experts 
As indicators are identified it is necessary to keep in mind whether any might be indicative of more than one type of risk, to 
avoid the trap of linear thinking.  
Below in figure 6.7 is a summary concept map which explains how a particular operational loss occurs. Typically we find that 
the story is highly complex involving many factors and sub-factors, but analysis can reveal a dominant structure which often 
can be represented by a simpler summary map like this. It is our experience that participants in the workshops held to describe 
these risk scenarios find them very informative of themselves as the pace of day to day business often means that they do not 
have time to sit together and think about potential challenges and how they might try to optimise their processes to reduce risk 
and improve efficiency. Enabling them to capture this dialogue without losing any of the complexity of their thinking is 
something that they found very valuable. For advanced businesses who conduct such discussions already, cognitive mapping 
represents a superior method for analysing the results of that discussion. 
 
Figure 6.7 – Concept map explanation of key features of an operational loss 
If we have sufficient data then other data mining approaches such as information theory, learning classifiers and genetic 
algorithms can be used to supplement expert knowledge. 
Once we have identified all the indicators and the cross connections are made, we have a complete network ready for carrying 
out some analysis as shown in figure 6.8.  
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forecasting tool all in one. 
Summary 
Risk appetite is a complex concept and has profound implications to practitioners, regulators, as well as academics. However, 
existing literature and methodologies on risk appetite have limitations in helping to derive the real sense of the concept. We 
argue that through using systems thinking, a holistic view of risk appetite can be elicited. In order to do so, we have proposed 
a practical methodology based on concept mapping and Bayesian Belief Networks.  
Concept maps and influence diagrams derived from executive and stakeholder interviews can be modelled successfully using 
BNs, capturing the large amount of knowledge that they have about the complex dynamics of business risk and supporting 
their judgement with real observations. This provides a powerful tool to look at how evidence affects the system and permits 
expert judgement to seed a model but not dominate it as real world clues can be substituted over time. The visibility of the 
node probabilities is perhaps the most significant feature of the BN and they provide a deep understanding of the behaviour of 
the system. Historically, BNs have often been too complex for sensible practical applications, but the authors have found that a 
first step of cognitive analysis gives sufficient clarity for the key variables of a risk scenario to be captured in a meaningful 
model that truly represents the relevant dynamics of the situation without becoming overly complex. 
In live situations the authors find that company staff find it easy to share their knowledge of a situation through discussion and 
that the use of cognitive maps to elicit a candidate BN helps staff to rapidly form consensus on an appropriate model. The 
ability to challenge and refine a model in real time during a discussion is also very efficient and effective. The parameterisation 
in terms of lower level variables makes it easier for them to provide robust data evidence to support their judgement and they 
find it more straightforward to intelligently challenge the model. 
Setting the limits by propagating evidence through the BN is intuitive for the experts, who now understand the model, and they 
can see explicitly how the model is attempting to make trade-offs in light of non-linear dependencies between factors. Unlike 
“black box” dependency structures this explicit causal structure permits direct challenge and refinement. Importantly, the final 
model remains in a form and language which is recognisable by the business experts, unlike statistical models which, in their 
ultimate form, have no connection with business processes at all. 
The advantages include: 
? Easier to test sensitivities and what-if analysis 
? Combines hard and soft data 
? Incorporate hard and soft evidence 
? Fast computation in real-time 
? Can be projected sensibly through trends in drivers 
? Easy to communicate 
? Can combine with statistical models 
A possible limitation of our approach is that concept mapping is not currently a skill that is widespread throughout the risk 
community. To be done properly and in real-time takes a degree of practice and skill. Likewise, but to a lesser extent, 
Bayesian Networks (BN) are not common practice. However, over many years of practical application the authors find that it is 
possible to transfer those skills relatively quickly to the relevant staff and that confidence and expertise grow through use. 
When using BNs it is important not to have too many child to parent nodes (more than 4) as the conditional probability matrix 
can become unwieldy. BNs do not currently cope easily with dynamic feedback loops, often required in complex systems, 
however many software tools provide for dynamic Bayesian network features where information can be passed from one time 
period to another, so where this is essential for a particular model it can be done. Work is on-going in the BN community to 
extend functionality in this area and it could be the subject of future research to develop this paper. 
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7. EMERGING RISK – USING CONNECTIVITY AND PHYLOGENETICS 
This chapter first provides a brief background of the phylogenetic approach and its applicability to risks, then describes a 
walkthrough of the technical steps required to build an evolutionary tree, followed by a section on how to interpret evolutionary 
trees in a risk context. Finally, the methodology is applied to case study of a multi-line, international insurance company.  
Although the theories underlying phylogenetics (often referred to as cladistics where the use of taxa is present) have been in 
place for a relatively long time, they have only really become popular in the past few decades due to the availability of 
increased computing power. Today it is a rapidly expanding field of study with new analytical techniques being developed 
almost daily. The approach given here is intended to allow the reader to understand the basic steps required for tree 
construction, but some familiarity with the software is necessary to allow the reader to repeat the analysis accurately.  
A Simple Illustrative Example of the Phylogenetics Approach 
The process of phylogenetic analysis in biology is inherently composed of two phases: assembling a data matrix containing 
relevant information; and inferring phylogenetic tree(s) from that matrix (Mishler, 2005). The phylogeny problem can then be 
described in a matrix such that each element  (i, j), in such a matrix, corresponds to the state of character j within entity i. 
figure 7.1 below illustrates a  simple biological example, provided by Kitching et al. (1998).  
 
Figure 7.1 – An Example Application of the Parsimony Algorithm (after Kitching, 1998) 
First, a set of six characters is described: (a) paired fins; (b) jaws; (c) large dermal bones; (d) fin rays; (e) lungs; and (f) rasping 
tongue. For each of the species, its characters are measured against these six characters with 1 denoting their existence and 
0 their absence. Once all species and characters are elicited in the matrix, a phylogenetic tree (cladogram) can be obtained to 
represent the evolutionary relationship between the different species. Then, a V-shaped tree structure is established for 
placing species relative to each other. It is assumed that the characters of species evolve from nothing to existence and 
therefore one of the two branches shall be occupied by the species with the least characters, i.e., the lamprey.  
The next step is to repeat the selection method to find the organism that owns the least changes to the lamprey. By calculating 
the least difference between each species, it turns out that the shark has the least score as shark has three changes to 
lamprey while the other candidates have four respectively. Thus, the other branch of the tree is devoted to the shark. Following 
this logic, a new tree structure can be established using the shark and salmon, and finally the lizard can be added next to 
salmon, as the lizard evolves through the longest evolution path.  
The example given above only demonstrates the logic behind the parsimony algorithm. In reality, of course, there are far more 
than four species with many more than six characters to analyze. Furthermore, the previous example does not guarantee to 
generate a tree that is optimal (Pagel et al, 2007).  Computer-aided programs are needed for the analysis; which is discussed 
in detail in the tree construction section later in this chapter.  
Brief Background to Phylogenetics and Risk  
Mitleton-Kelly (2003) and Morel and Ramanujam (1999) argue that evolution is a signature of complex adaptive systems and 
(a) paired fins, (b) jaws, (c) large dermal bones, (d) fin rays, (e) lungs, and (f) 
rasping tongue 
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hence risks should, by definition, evolve and follow evolutionary principles.  
We can further elucidate the discussion of risk as an evolving system by drawing conceptual parallels between biological 
evolution and risk evolution (table 7.1), and by observing that risk evolution follows a ‘Darwinian criteria’ (table 7.2). 
Biological Evolution  Linguistic Evolution  Enterprise Risk Evolution  
Discrete characters  Vocabulary, combined sounds  Descriptions, causes, loses,     Solvency II categories  
Common ancestors  Words with common origin  Risks from common origin e.g. Fraud, pricing  
Mutation  Innovation  Innovation, regulation  
Natural selection  Social selection  Regulatory/Management   selection  
Horizontal gene transfer  Borrowing from other languages  Transfer of info between businesses and industries  
Fossils  Ancient texts  Historic case studies, losses  
Species splitting into others  Language Lineage Splits  Risk categories (strategic, operational, financial etc)  
Extinction  Language death  Risk eradication  
Table 7.1 – Conceptual parallels between biological and risk evolution. Based on a table by Pagel et al (2007) showing conceptual 
parallels between language evolution and biological evolution.  
Darwinian Criteria  Justification in culture/parallel to risk 
Variation  Variation in risks is obvious  
Competition  Risks exist in an environment where they are 
constantly subject to risk management. Only 
risks with certain characteristics can persist 
under this selective pressure  
Inheritance  Risks that form out of previous risks  
Accumulation of Modifications  Accumulation of failures, changes in regulation 
and attempts at risk management will cause 
modifications to risk characteristics  
Adaption  Response to environment : regulatory, 
management, competition etc.  
Table 7.2 – A Darwinian criteria applied to risk evolution. Based on a table by Mesoudi et al. (2004)  
 
 
 
 
It is important to note that there are three key differences between risk and biological evolution: 
1. In biological studies it is only possible to get data on species which form only a small subset of the total evolutionary 
data. However in risk analysis there is an advantage of being able to access all the data so long as companies are 
correctly identifying all their risks. 
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2. Risks do not exist at a given time as a varied population in which selection can act and only the fittest species survive. 
Instead risks have varied multiple possible future states in which ‘risk selection’ can act. It is only those risks that 
avoid proper management that are ‘fit’ enough to survive. 
3. One element missing from risk evolution is a unit of inheritance (DNA in Biology), but it is worth noting that Darwin did 
not require DNA when he formulated the theory of evolution. 
Nonetheless the equivalences from table 7.1 and table 7.2 allow the evolution of risk to be perceived in a similar context to 
standard biological evolution. This conceptual equivalence opens up the possibility of tools from evolutionary biology being 
successfully applied to studying risk. The next question is how are the evolutionary trees constructed using phylogenetic 
analysis and then how are they interpreted.  
Phylogenetic Trees 
Phylogenetic trees represent the evolutionary relationship between a set of taxa (in this case risks, risk scenarios or losses) 
based on the similarities and differences in certain characteristics of those taxa. A phylogenetic tree consists of a series of 
nodes that are connected by branches (see figure7.2). On a phylogenetic tree the internal nodes represent hypothetical 
ancestors whilst the terminal nodes represent the set of taxa (risks) for which data is available. Evolution occurs independently 
along the branches emanating from each internal node. If at an internal node there are offspring that cannot be represented in 
a bifurcating pattern then a multifurcating tree is required. This occurs if one species splits off into several different lineages. 
A tree may be rooted, in which case the root is the hypothetical ancestor of all the taxa in the tree. Alternatively a tree may not 
have a root and be un-rooted. Un-rooted trees will describe the relationship among taxa but are limited by the fact that they do 
not allow the entire evolutionary pathway to be seen. 
 
Figure 7.2 – Phylogenetic trees. The tree on the left is rooted whilst the tree on the right un-rooted. In this tree, data for nodes 1-5 
was available whilst nodes 7-9 represent hypothetical ancestors. On the rooted tree, internal node 6 represents the hypothetical 
ancestor of all the taxa (risks); to know what this taxa may be like and its characteristic is of great interest for us to be able to 
understand the external taxa (risks) better.  
The application of the phylogenetic tree approach, which is composed of nodes, and branches that link nodes, is not restricted 
to organisms. It can be utilised for all individual entities with taxonomic characters, such as species, populations, individuals, 
genes, or even organisations (McCarthy et al, 2000), and also enterprise risks (Allan, Cantle and Yin, 2010).  
 
 
Constructing a Tree of Risk Evolution 
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The algorithms used are available in the MEGA software package. The overall tree construction process can be summarised 
using the following diagram in figure 7.3: 
Figure 7.3 – The basic steps for evolutionary tree construction  
Preparing the data 
The data will need to be in a matrix format with risks, risk scenarios or losses in rows; and with characteristics of those risks, 
scenarios or losses as the columns. A ‘1’ represents the presence of a character and a space or ‘0’ represents a lack of that 
character. An example is shown in table 7.3 below, with typical risk categories used as characters in the columns.  
 
Table 7.3 – Typical example of a dataset for a phylogenetic analysis  
There are of course times when the presence of a character is not as simple as present (1) or not (0). Although it is possible to 
enhance the methodology to make allowance for this, the authors find that the analysis is somewhat easier to conduct and still 
provides meaningful results if this subtlety is omitted. There is therefore no allowance for proportions in the methodology 
illustrated in this report, with a best estimate being used to determine whether a particular character is at relevant to the 
description of a particular scenario. The rule of thumb is that if you are in doubt about a particular character, you should 
assume a scenario has it.  
Prepare Data
Step 2 
Identify outgroups 
of highly related risks
Step 3
Apply exact 
algorithm to each 
group
Step 4
Combine set of 
solutions for each 
group
Step 1 
Produce 
approximate initial 
tree
Step 5 
Rejoin out groups 
into a single final tree
Step 6 
Verify the tree
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Step 1 – Produce an initial tree 
The first step is to produce an approximate initial tree. For between 20 and 30 risks the “min-mini” algorithm at search level 1 
will work in a reasonable amount of time (approximately less than 1 hour) but for a larger amount of risks use the “close 
neighbour interchange” algorithm. Use a search level of 3 and 300 random addition trees since this will increase accuracy but 
not significantly slow the process.  
The aim of this step is only to identify groups of highly related risks and not to construct a perfect evolutionary tree. Since the 
algorithms used here are heuristic they should be run a few times to ensure an optimal solution.   
Typically there will be a large number of equally parsimonious trees that need to be represented by a single tree. We use the 
‘consense’ program for this purpose. This process is illustrated below in figures 7.4a-e. 
 
Figure 7.4a – Output from the software showing there can be multiple trees which are equally parsimonious 
Figure 7.4b – Each line of output can be visualised as a tree 
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Figure 7.4c – Other equally parsimonious trees 
All these trees are then input into ‘consense’, which gives the best consensus of all the equally parsimonious trees.  
The output from the ‘consense’ analysis is then shown in figure 7.4d, and graphically in figure 7.4e.  
 
Figure 7.4d – Output from ‘consense’ which is illustrated as a tree in figure 7.4e below 
 
 
Figure 7.4e – An illustration of the tree in figure 7.4d and an output from ‘consense’ 
 
Step 2 – Identify groups of highly related risks 
The next step is to use the program CTree to identify highly related risk groups. To input the data into CTree correctly, the 
numeric values in the ‘out-tree’ file from ‘consense’ need to be set to ‘1’. 
The aim here is to a tree root on which a more accurate algorithm can be applied. Deciding on these groups can be difficult 
and requires an amount of care. The groupings and rooting provided by CTree should be checked against the tree produced in 
the previous step to ensure that they are sensible. The software gives some guidance on this step. An example of this is 
shown in figures 7.5 a-b.  
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Figure 7.5a – cTree output marking the root of the tree with a red dot on the left 
 
Figure 7.5b – cTree output showing a rooted tree with the red dot as the root. This now gives direction to the evolution. 
 
Step 3 – Apply exact algorithms to groups of highly related risks 
Apply the “max-mini branch and bound” algorithm in MEGA to each of these groups of highly related risks. This will give 
confidence that the evolutionary history of each of these groups is being represented as accurately as possible.   
Step 4 – Combine set of solutions for each group of highly related risks 
Using Complexity Science in ERM 55 
Practical tools for Risk Appetite 
And Emerging Risk 
10 November, 2011 
It is likely that there is still more than one ‘best’ evolutionary tree for each set of highly related risks. For further analysis 
combine these trees using ‘consense’. Each tree for each group of highly related risks should then be rooted as in the rooted 
tree produced by CTree. 
Step 5 – Rejoin groups into a final tree  
Each group of highly related risks should be joined together to produce a final single tree. The groups should be positioned so 
that this tree is of the same form as the tree produced in step 1.  
Verify Evolutionary Tree 
The best way to validate the tree is to check if the results are sensible from a business perspective. If it can be corroborated 
with other data or by someone who knows the business, then that would lend support to the conclusions.  
However a couple of useful metrics do exist: the consistency index, which is a measure of how well the character data fits the 
evolutionary tree; and the retention index, which is a measure of common ancestry in an evolutionary tree. As a guide the 
retention index should be over 0.5 and the consistency index should be around the value given by the following equation 
ܥ݋݊ݏ݅ݏݐ݁݊ܿݕ ݅݊݀݁ݔ ൌ  0.90 െ 0.022 כ ோܰ ൅ 0.000213 כ ሺ ோܰሻଶ, 
where ோܰ is the number of risks in the study. 
If either of these values is far from their suggested value the tree should be interpreted cautiously. 
Modelling risk evolution using phylogenetic analysis 
Some of the advantages of using a phylogenetic approach are: 
Better Risk Classification 
Early attempts to classify biological phenomena required an initial labelling process with reference to a hierarchy of criteria – 
not dissimilar to the way in which a typical risk classification system works today. However, biologists found this to be 
unsatisfactory because organisms would often share similar high level classification traits but ultimately bear little resemblance 
to each other. Phylogenetic analysis fundamentally differs from previous approaches in that it does not attempt to match items 
to a predetermined list of criteria – rather it simply looks at the characteristics of the phenomena being studied and identifies a 
way to group them in the simplest, most parsimonious, way.  
Using phylogenetics for risk analysis provides a completely new way of looking at risk classification. By grouping risk by 
evolutionary history, risks no longer have to be classified as a series of similar events. Instead they can be seen as emerging 
from a complex system, thus allowing a unique understanding of how risks are organised.  
Phylogenetic analysis removes subjectivity in risk classification using evolution as a kind of external reference point. This can 
be used to provide a methodology that makes clear the data, assumptions and results with the intention of making risk 
classification decisions transparent. It cuts across organisation boundaries and disciples and looks at risks for what they, are at 
an almost fundamental level and then groups them accordingly. This can be particularly useful for losses, if good loss data 
about individual losses is available. 
Understanding Risk History  
Phylogenetics can trace how risks have changed over time. This allows a much deeper understanding of the risks. Risks need 
no longer be seen as an event occurring now but can instead be understood by the interacting circumstances that have 
brought the risk into its current form. This allows companies to better understand their vulnerabilities and how to manage their 
risks better.  
Predicting Risk Futures 
Phylogenetics provides a way to use the history of risk evolution as an indication of its future evolutionary pathway. Although 
past corporate behaviour does not ensure an understanding of future outcomes, it provides a guide to major risk factors, and 
understanding the history of a risk will give glimpses as to its future. By no longer viewing risk as a fixed entity but one that 
varies over time, a risk’s variations can be traced and its future state predicted.  
Risk can change and evolve in many ways but this does appear to happen in some predictable ways. Predicting the future of 
the evolution of a risk will not only allow better risk mitigation but can prevent new risks from forming. From this, risks can be 
mitigated before they have even been fully identified as risks.  
The methodology identifies small groups of highly related risks which share a common ancestor. The evolutionary history of 
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each of the groups can then be accurately traced. By understanding the phylogeny of the risks we can: 
? Determine where evolution is most prolific; 
? Detail path dependency and co-evolution of risks; 
? Identify the most active (evolutionary) characteristic to manage; and, 
? Create focused scenarios for emerging risks modelling.  
Case study - a multiline international insurance company  
The case study analysis uses the same steps as discussed above and presented in figure 7.4 above.  
The data used in the case-study was only a small sub-set of a wider study done for the insurer. Whilst the details of the report 
on the overall emerging risk exposure are confidential, we can report that the company’s risk team stated that, ”the procedure 
enabled a more realistic picture of the risk landscape to be obtained and it gave a clearer insight into how business unit’s risks 
were developing.” 
Data Preparation 
Each data set consists of a matrix with risks in the rows and then 59 columns representing the possible characteristics that 
each risk scenario contains. The data set used in this case study consisted of different country risk registers, which has the 
characteristics of each risk broken down into 59 categories specified within the organisation’s risk classification system.  
When risk characteristics are referred to by name their number will follow in brackets. For example ‘Portfolio Risk Selection’ is 
character 1 and this will be written as ‘Portfolio Risk Selection’ (1). The risk codes are used for ease of labelling the trees and 
the coding is listed below for the 59 risk categories.  
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Risk Risk code  Risk Risk code 
1.1 Portfolio risk selection 1  5.06 Employment Practices / Safe Environment 31 
1.2 Portfolio Management 2  5.07 Employment Practices / Diversity & Discrim. 32 
1.3 Claims management 3  5.08 Improper Business or Market Practices 33 
1.4 Technical Reserving 4  5.09 Published Financial Statements 34 
1.5 Reinsurance arrangements 5  5.10 Advisory activities 35 
1.6 Longevity risk (Pension) 6  5.11 Damage to Physical Assets 36 
1.7 Pricing 7  5.12 Bus disruption & sys failures / Systems 37 
2.1 Reinsurance Credit Risk 8  5.13 Transaction Capture & Maintenance 38 
2.2 Insurance products credit risk 9  5.14 Monitoring & Reporting 39 
2.3 Insurance operations credit risk 10  5.15 Customer Intake and Documentation 40 
2.4 Invested assets credit risk 11  5.16 Customer & Client Account Management 41 
3.1 Asset and liability matching 12  5.17 Trade counterparties 42 
3.2 Investment default 13 
 
5.18 Vendors & Suppliers 43 
3.3 Currency risk 14 
 
5.19 Compliance with existing regulation 44 
3.4 Basis risk 15 
 
5.20 Increase in regulatory costs 45 
3.5 Property price depreciation 16 
 
5.21 Failure to implement Solvency II 46 
3.6 Equity risk 17 
 
5.22 Cross sector funding FSCF 47 
3.7 Interest rate risk 18 
 
5.23 Product Flaws 48 
3.8 Commodity risk 19 
 
5.24 Expenses overruns 49 
3.9 Spread risk 20 
 
6.1 Regulators 50 
4.1 Assets liquidity 21 
 
6.2 Corporate responsibility 51 
4.2 Funding liquidity 22 
 
6.3 Investors / JV Partners 52 
4.3 Liability liquidity 23 
 
6.4 Media 53 
4.4 FX liquidity 24 
 
7.1 Legal, Public Affairs & Regulatory 54 
4.5 Intra-day liquidity 25 
 
7.2 Macro-Economic 55 
5.01 Internal fraud / Unauthorised Transactions 26 
 
7.3 Changing Claims Patterns 56 
5.02 Internal fraud / Theft and Fraud 27 
 
8.1 Strategic - Internal 57 
5.03 External Fraud / Theft and Fraud 28 
 
8.2 Strategic - External 58 
5.04 External Fraud / System Security 29 
 
8.3 Strategic - General 59 
5.05 Employment Practices / Employee Relations 30 
   
 
The actual pilot study project consisted of 7 different country data sets but for clarity we have selected just two, Ireland & the 
UK, to illustrate the phylogenetic analysis technique and interpretation. The data for Ireland and the UK are shown below in 
partial form for ease of reading.  
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We have used the data to produce 2 country specific trees, Ireland and UK, as this also allows us to look across the pair of 
trees to look for patterns and possible co-evolution trends. The resulting evolutionary risk tree for Ireland showing clades (A,B 
& C) is shown below in figure 7.4 and for the UK in figure 7.5 showing clades D & E. 
Ireland Tree  
 
Figure 7.4 – The phylogenetic tree of risk evolution for Ireland  
The numbers on the legs of the tree represent the codes of the risk characteristics (some of the key ones have been described 
too) that have been acquired in the evolution of that risk. A red number means a risk character has been lost in the evolution, 
similar to humans losing a tail in their evolution. The risks at the end of the tree legs are the risks given in the risk registers and 
represent the most current risks identified e.g. (IRE – 1 is Economic Downturn ). The nodes represent some earlier risk that 
existed but has now evolved. The clades A, B & C represent clusters of at least 3 tree legs and clade-forming characters are of 
particular interest, which will be explained below in the discussion section.  
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Country Consistency index Retention index 
Ireland 0.86 0.65 
UK 0.80 0.70 
Table 7.6 – Tree verifications 
Interpretation and points to note on the risk trees 
In each country the evolution of key risk characters has resulted in the formation of new risks. These key risk characters, help 
identify the drivers of the risks that the organisation in each country and which are similar across countries. A group formed of 
three or more risks that can be traced back to the evolution of a single risk character is called a clade7. It is these clades that 
can provide a unique re-organisation and classification of the risks. The original risk character that forms the clade can be 
thought of as the key evolutionary risk character for that clade, and from that character resultant risks have already emerged.  
The key characters for each country can be summed up in the following table. This table also indentifies the key evolutionary 
risks that are relevant in each country.  
Clade Country Key evolutionary risk characters Resultant Risks 
A 
B 
 
C 
Ireland Portfolio Management (2) 
Pricing (7) 
 
Transaction Capture & Maintenance 
(38) 
IRE-2, IRE-9, IRE-10* 
IRE-1, IRE-2,IRE-9,IRE-10 
IRE-14,IRE-8 
IRE-3*,IRE-4,IRE-7,IRE-12 
D 
E 
 
UK Claims Management (3) 
Pricing (7) 
 
UK-5,UK-7,UK-9 
UK-8,UK-2,UK-4,UK-3,UK-6, 
UK-1 
 
Table 7.7 – Evolutionary traits of countries 
*no longer contains character 
Key observations and questions  
For Ireland, ‘Pricing’ (7) is the most important risk character since it defines clade B. Also important is the character ‘Portfolio 
Management’ (2) since this combined with ‘Pricing’ (7) to form a sub-clade (clade A) of the risks ‘IRE-2’, ‘IRE-9’ and ‘IRE-10’. 
What is then particularly interesting is that Pricing in the risk ‘IRE-10’, which is ‘Implementation Period Payments’, loses the 
character ‘Pricing’ (7), which is indicated by a red number seven.  
Risks should increase in complexity and any risk that loses characters may be unstable or in a process of changing. We know 
from biology, and studies of viruses in particular, that losing characters can be a signal of specialisation. Again using the 
example of humans losing our tails, this may also be seen as a specialisation necessary to adapt to new surroundings and 
needs. Also one should ask the question what the risk ‘IRE -10’ would look like if it regained the pricing character. Any risk that 
is losing characters should be scrutinised to explain why this might be happening.  
Notably, Ireland ‘IRE-1’ is quite distinct from any other risks due to its large number of characters. This is may be to be 
expected from a risk like ‘Economic Downturn’ because this risk is complex and covers many areas; it could also be argued 
that it is too high level and should be split into more defined areas like ‘housing crises’, ‘euro crises’, etc. It is always important 
to look for branches with the most characters as this indicates significant evolution and where there has been evolution and 
much change we are likely to see more evolution. 
One can argue that where there has been the most evolution is where you are more likely to see new species emerge, for 
example a warm jungle is host to more forms of life than the cold tundra, so you would expect more new species and more 
evolution in the jungle. So using this line of thought we would also be interested in ‘IRE – 7’, ‘Inadequate Data Privacy 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
7 This could be any number but we have used three per clade in this study 
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Procedures’, as it has had three branches and has many characters on the final branch. The next question would be how 
might it evolve? If it were to combine with ‘IRE-12’,’Immature Capability re On-line Channel’, to create a new risk what might 
that look like? Maybe something like the Sony Play Station data breach? 
In the UK there are two clades formed from the key characters ‘Claims management’ (3) (clade D) and ‘Pricing’ (7) (clade E). 
Interestingly in the UK there are three risks which show no relation to any others ‘UK-11’, ‘UK-14’and ‘UK-15’.  Risks that have 
not changed significantly are more likely to be stable; however, this should be checked against whether the risks have not 
been described in sufficient detail.  
Comparing IRE & UK Trees 
In both the UK and Ire trees the character ‘Pricing’ (7) is prominent; this might not be too surprising for an international 
insurance company. Comparing the tree structures we can see that Ireland has a cascading clade that has ‘portfolio 
management’ (2), as a key character that evolves from ‘pricing’ (7), and then ‘portfolio selection’ (1), emerging from portfolio 
management’ (2). The UK on the other hand, has a slightly different structure but with the same characters i.e. ‘Pricing’ (7), 
then ‘portfolio selection’ (1), then ‘portfolio management’ (2). So what should come first in the evolution of the related risks: 
portfolio selection or portfolio management? This may be immaterial but the UK tree goes on to produce a risk ‘UK-1’ that is 
the result of another branch with a character ‘reinsurance provision’ (5). Ireland does not even seem to have this character 
anywhere on the tree - should it and where should it be? These would be areas for the risk manager to investigate. The 
visualisation of the risks and characters in a tree format enable this sort of observation to be quickly spotted that would be 
difficult and tiresome in a spreadsheet. 
Co-evolution patterns 
Looking at individual country trees and then both together we can also look for patterns of co-evolution, which means that 
characters or risks have a tendency to evolve in each other’s presence. In nature, where co-evolution occurs, it often creates 
more rapid evolution and adaption e.g. a bird that develops a long beak to get nectar from a flower and the flower that 
continues to extend the long shape of the flower until a symbiotic dependant relationship is developed.  
In the trees we have an example of risk IRE (7) ‘inadequate data privacy procedures’ that has a strong possibility that it might 
gain a ‘media’ (53) character because: 
‘Media’ (53) only evolves in the presence of ‘Investors/JV Partners’ (52) . So we can investigate risks that have character (52), 
but not yet (53). These conditions are found in risk IRE (7)’inadequate data privacy procedures’. Now couple this piece of 
information with the earlier warning that IRE(7) may combine ‘Inadequate Data Privacy Procedures’ and we have an 
interesting new risk scenario emerging.  
Other patterns in the history of risk evolution can be traced and used to predict future outcomes. These are discussed in the 
table below: 
Character name  Pattern in history  Insight into Possible Emerging Risks 
Reinsurance Credit Risk (8), Insurance 
Products Credit Risk+A23 (9), 
Insurance operations credit risk (10) 
and Invested Assets Credit Risk (11) 
All evolve simultaneously in ‘IRE-1’ and 
‘UK-11’. 
As would maybe be expected 
‘IRE-5’ has ‘Insurance operations credit risk’ (10) 
and may gain Reinsurance Credit Risk (8), 
Insurance Products Credit Risk+A23 (9) and 
Invested Assets Credit Risk (11). 
External Fraud / Theft and Fraud (28), 
External Fraud / System Security (29). 
All evolve simultaneously in ‘IRE-7’ and 
‘UK-5’. 
If one of these characters evolves in a future risk 
then the other is likely to follow.  
Regulators (50) When ‘Regulators’ (50) evolves so does 
‘Compliance With Existing Regulation’ 
(44).  
‘IRE-7’ has ‘Regulators’ (50) but not ‘Compliance 
With Existing Regulation’ (44). ‘IRE-7’ liking to gain 
‘Compliance With Existing Regulation’ (44) 
Media (53) Only evolves in presence of ‘Investors / 
JV Partners’ (52) 
Only risks that have ‘Investors / JV Partners’ (52) 
likely to gain ‘Media’ (53). 
General (59) Only evolves if ‘Internal’ (57) is present. Only like to evolve if ‘Internal’ (57) is present. 
Table 7.8 – Evolutionary patterns 
8. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Looking at risk management, in particular risk appetite and emerging risks, from a systemological perspective is both useful 
and insightful. Modern risk management is complex and ERM requires a holistic approach to make sense of the layers, 
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interconnections and non-quantitative measures.  
Our analogy of a heating system for risk appetite provides a common sense overview of the nature of the problem. The 
proposed integration of Concept Mapping and a Bayesian Network approach, embraces systems thinking, though looking at 
interconnections and integrating qualitative and quantitative measures. It has the benefits of being scalable from small/simple 
to large/complex but with the same underlying rigour.  
It can be applied to any type of firm and can demonstrate visually to all stakeholders the impact of emerging information and 
new evidence. It easily accommodates expert knowledge which is then verified when data is available. As shown in the 
example in chapter 6, it provides a robust basis for setting and monitoring risk appetite limits and importantly is in a form that 
retains the interest of the relevant business professionals. It provides an easily explained narrative with evidence and a model 
to test scenarios that can also be used as an audit trail.  
We commend this approach to the profession as a readily available methodology with robust theoretical underpinnings. Recent 
advances in Bayesian Network software allows for easier manipulation and visualisation of complex models. The success of 
the techniques, as with all models, relies on the skill and experience of the user. The skill set of the professional actuary is well 
suited to this approach, though some time will be required to understand and facilitate concept mapping workshops. 
Emerging risk identification is a holy grail in risk management. The evolutionary approach taken in this study is novel and 
embraces the Darwinian concept that competition and the external environment imply constant change. This can also apply to 
risks, losses and indeed any organisational issue when viewed as a complex adaptive system.  
The emerging risk approach uses phylogenetic theory as the means of constructing evolutionary risk trees and their 
interpretation. The science of phylogeny is a rapidly expanding discipline that combines biology and mathematics. New (free) 
software programs and algorithms allow easy access for actuaries to be able to construct their own risk trees. Interpretation of 
the evolutionary trees is more subjective but the detailed guidance given in the report will allow for useful insights and 
questions to be asked about an organisation’s risk classifications, appropriate risk scenarios and potent risk characteristics.  
Every organisation and industry will have unique risk trees, as each company will have had a unique history. From that 
platform we believe it is possible to obtain insight into what the future risks might look like and indeed what they are not likely 
to be. This approach is in its infancy but promises a new way of conceiving and thinking about risks and risk management 
more generally, particularly in an ERM context.  
Feedback from the executives involved in the case studies and subsequent trials in other organisations, find the Bayesian 
Network approach an immediate solution to a pressing regulatory need. They find the emerging risk approach stimulated their 
thinking and helped them to focus on some key areas of the business under threat. In some cases the analysis confirmed 
intuitive thoughts and in others genuinely identified new areas for investigation.  
The authors would genuinely welcome input and comments on this report. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Agent Based Model: a type of computer simulation that models the relationships and behaviours of agents within a complex 
system, in order to model the emergent behaviour of the system as a whole. 
Artificial Neural Network: an automated multi nonlinear regression process capable of learning. 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN, Belief Networks or Bayesian Nets): a directed acyclic graph (DAG) models to represent 
knowledge about uncertain domains. 
Bayesian Networks: a system based on Bayesian probability theory that can perform inference and learning. 
Cellular Automata: a discrete modelling approach to explore the behaviour of a complex system. 
Chaos Theory: a mathematical theory to explain complexity, dynamics, and the nonlinearity of a system. 
Cladistics: a method of classifying species of organisms into groups. 
Cladogram: a diagram that shows ancestral relationships between organs/species. 
Cognitive Mapping: a technique to visualise the complex and nonlinear relationships between different concepts or cognitive 
constructs. 
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS): an explanatory framework for helping people to understand complexity. 
Complex Systems: systems together with behaviour rules that cause the state of at least one of its objects to change over 
time. 
Complexity Science: a new field that studies universal principles common to all complex systems. 
Complexity: the inter-relationship, inter-action and inter-connectivity of elements within a system and between the system and 
its environment. 
Emerging Risks: Emerging risks are the emergence of unintended consequences as a result of complex interactions between 
strategic objectives, existing risks, risk management interventions, business and regulatory environment, markets and people’s 
behaviour. 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM): Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events 
that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives.  
Fuzzy Logic: a many-value logic dealing with fuzzy set numbers. 
Genetic Algorithm: an evolution-based approach applied for optimisation purposes. 
Hard Systems: those systems or problems with clearly defined goals, and missions that can be addressed via engineering 
methodologies in attempting to, in some sense, ‘optimise’ a solution. 
Network Theory: the theory deals with the application of networks. 
Phylogenetic analysis: a mathematical method to elicit evolutionary relationships. 
Risk Appetite: the comfort and preference for accepting a series of interconnected uncertainties related to achieving our 
strategic goals. 
Soft Systems: those systems or problems that are extremely complex, problematical, and often mysterious phenomena for 
which concrete goals cannot be established and which require learning in order to make improvement. 
System: any two or more elements that are interconnected for a purpose. 
System Theory: the multidisciplinary study of systems in general. 
Systemic Risks: a systemic risk materialises when an initial disturbance is transmitted through the networks of 
interconnections that link firms, households and financial institutions with each other; leading, as a result, to either the 
breakdown or degradation of these networks. 
Systems Dynamic Modelling: an approach to model the complex interrelationships, especially the casual and nonlinear 
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relationships, between system elements. 
Systems Thinking: the process of discovery and inquiry that uses techniques to understand the interrelationships and 
underlying patterns of problems and opportunities. 
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actuaries:  
? Transaction information: The number of bits of information required to identify the elements of a typical system 
transaction. 
? Network complexity: There are many measures of network complexity, but a key one is the average number of 
connections per network vertex (node). 
? Degree of hierarchy: The levels of hierarchy, or number of nested elements within a system. More complex systems 
have more levels. 
? Algorithmic information content: The number of bits in the shortest computer program that completely describes the 
system. 
? Logical depth: The number of steps a Turing machine would take to construct the series of 0s and 1s that completely 
describes a system. This is a measure of how difficult it is to construct a system. 
? Statistical complexity: The minimum amount of information about a system’s past behaviour required to predict its 
near-term future statistical behaviour. 
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Figure B2 – Using Systems models 
The comparison between the real world problem situation and systems models stimulates learning and action which in turn 
feeds back into the learning process. It is inevitable that in complex situations the model is not a true view of the situation but it 
can be sufficient for its purpose. It requires judgment to determine whether something is fit for purpose.  
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